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The dynamics of military revolution, 1300-2050

The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 aims to bridge a major
gap in the emerging literature on revolutions in military affairs. It suggests
that two very different phenomena have been at work over the past cen-
turies: “military revolutions,” which are driven by vast social and political
changes, and “revolutions in military affairs,” which military institutions
have directed, although usually with great difficulty and ambiguous results.
The work provides a conceptual framework and historical context for
understanding the patterns of change, innovation, and adaptation that
have marked war in the Western world since the fourteenth century –
beginning with Edward Ill’s revolution in medieval warfare, through the
development of modern military institutions in seventeenth-century France,
to the military impact of mass politics in the French Revolution, the cata-
clysmic military-industrial struggle of 1914-1918, and the German
Blitzkrieg victories of 1940. The work’s case studies and conceptual over-
view offer an indispensable introduction to revolutionary military
change – which is as inevitable as it is difficult to predict – in the twenty-
first century.

MacGregor Knox served in Vietnam as a rifle platoon leader with the 173rd
Airborne Brigade, and is now Stevenson Professor of International History
at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His other works
include Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941; Common Destiny: Dictatorship,
Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany; and Hitler’s
Italian Allies.

Williamson Murray served with the United States Air Force in Southeast
Asia. He has taught at Yale University, the Ohio State University, the Naval
War College, the Army War College and Marine Corps University. His
extensive work on twentieth-century military history includes co-author-
ship of the acclaimed history A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World
War.

The dynamics of military revolution, 1300-2050

The dynamics of military
revolution

1300-2050

Edited by

MACGREGOR KNOX
The London School of Economics

and Political Science

WILLIAMSON MURRAY
Institute for Defense Analyses

ffil C A M B R I D G E
^ P > UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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Cambridge University Press
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Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521800792

© MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray 2001

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written

permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2001
12th printing 2009

Printed in the United States of America

A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

The dynamics of military revolution, 1300-2050 / [edited by ] MacGregor Knox,

Williamson Murray.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-521-80079-X

1. Strategy – History. 2. Military art and science – History.
3. Revolutions – Europe – History. 4. Military history, Modern.

5. Europe – History, Military.
6. United States – History – Civil War, 1861-1865.

I. Knox, MacGregor II. Murray, Williamson
D25 D96 2001

355.02-dc21 00-066704

ISBN 978-0-521-80079-2 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs
for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not
guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Contents

Contributors page xi
Acknowledgments xiii
List of figures and tables xiv

i Thinking about revolutions in warfare 1
Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox

2 “As if a new sun had arisen”: England’s fourteenth-century
RMA 15

Clifford J. Rogers

3 Forging the Western army in seventeenth-century France
John A. Lynn

4 Mass politics and nationalism as military revolution:
The French Revolution and after 57

MacGregor Knox

5 Surviving military revolution: The U.S. Civil War 74
Mark Grimsley

6 The Prusso-German RMA, 1840-1871 92
Dennis E. Showalter

7 The battlefleet revolution, 1885-1914 114
Holger H. Herwig

8 The First World War and the birth of modern warfare 132
Jonathan B. A. Bailey

9 May 1940: Contingency and fragility of the German RMA 154
Williamson Murray

10 Conclusion: The future behind us 175
Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox

Index 195

IX

35

Contributors

Brigadier Jonathan B. A. Bailey
MBE, ADC

Director Royal Artillery
British Army

Mark Grimsley
Professor of History
The Ohio State University

Holger H. Herwig
Professor of Strategy
The University of Calgary

MacGregor Knox
Stevenson Professor of Internation;

History
The London School of Economics

and Political Science

John A. Lynn
Professor of History
The University of Illinois at

Urbana-Champaign

Williamson Murray
Senior Fellow
Institute for Defense Analyses

Clifford J. Rogers
Professor of History
The United States Military

Academy

Dennis E. Showalter
Professor of History
Colorado College

XI

Acknowledgments

This book has been long in gestation, but the issues it addresses are not
likely to disappear soon. We owe thanks above all to our contributors for
their skill and patience. We remain abidingly grateful to The Marine Corps
University and The Marine Corps University Foundation, Quantico,
Virginia, for the generous support and hospitality they offered to the
April 1996 conference on “Historical Parameters of Revolutions in
Military Affairs” from which this book evolved. Finally, we wish to express
our lasting appreciation to Andrew W. Marshall, always a light in the
darkness, for his contributions over many years to the understanding of
military effectiveness, and to the security of the United States and of its
allies. All have added in one way or another to the book’s strengths; its
remaining weaknesses are above all our responsibility.

MACGREGOR KNOX WILLIAMSON MURRAY

London Alexandria, Virginia

xiu

Figures and tables

F I G U R E S
3.1 French battalion formations, 1622-1750 page 37
3.2 A French infantry battalion deployed for battle,

ca. 1670-90 39
3.3 24-pounder French cannon of the Valliere system and de

nouvelle invention 42

T A B L E S
I . I Revolutions in military affairs and military revolutions 13
3.1 Barrel and shot weight of French cannon, 1650-1800 43

xiv

1

Thinking about revolutions in warfare
W I L L I A M S O N M U R R A Y A N D M A C G R E G O R K N O X

The term “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) became decidedly fashion-
able in the course of the 1990s. It lies at the heart of debates within the
Pentagon over future strategy and has gained increasing prominence in
Washington’s byzantine budgetary and procurement struggles. Yet few
works throw light on the concept’s past, help situate it or the phenomena
it claims to describe within a sophisticated historical framework, or offer
much guidance in understanding the potential magnitude and direction of
future changes in warfare. This book is an effort to answer those needs.

C O N C E P T U A L R O O T S

Current notions of revolutions in military affairs derive from two principal
sources: early modern historians and Soviet military theorists. The closely
related concept of “military revolution” emerged in 1955 in an inaugural
lecture by the British historian Michael Roberts.1 Roberts argued that in the
early seventeenth century, under the leadership of the warrior-king

1 Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660 (Belfast, 1956), reprinted in
Michael Roberts, Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967), and in Clifford J. Rogers,
ed., The Military Revolution Debate, Readings on the Military Transformation of Early
Modern Europe (Boulder, CO, 1995). For a different view see Geoffrey Parker, “The
‘Military Revolution,’ 1 5 6 0 – 1 6 6 0 – A M y t h ? ” and “In Defense of ‘The Military
Revolution,'” in Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate. See also Geoffrey Parker, The
Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800
(Cambridge, 1988). It is significant that the Rogers book, published in 1995, used the
singular of “Revolution” in its title. The extent of scholarly interest is suggested by the
following list of articles: Gunther E. Rothenberg, “Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus
Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the ‘Military Revolution’ of the Seventeenth
Century,” in Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, eds., Makers of Modern

(continued)

I

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2 Murray and Knox

Gustavus Adolphus, Sweden had embarked on a military revolution that
had swept away traditional approaches to military organization and tactics
throughout the West.1 That claim provoked several decades of furious
debate over the extent and nature of the changes in sixteenth- and seven-
teenth-century warfare.3 In the end, most specialists came to agree that
Roberts had been correct in suggesting that European warfare in this period
had undergone fundamental systemic changes. But until the 1990s, military
historians focused on other periods of Western history had largely ignored
the concepts developed in the debate that Roberts had opened.4

The second major influence on the development of the notion of revolu-
tions in military affairs was the writings of Soviet military theorists from the
1960s onward. Marxist-Leninist indoctrination made the Red Army, from
its beginnings, receptive to notions of major revolutionary change. Soviet
theorists had pioneered in analyzing the overall impact of the First World
War on military technique in the 1920s and early 1930s.5 Stalin’s attempts
to ensure the “security of the rear” and his own uncontested domination by
massacring his military elite checked the Red Army’s development of mod-
ern operational theories from 1937 onward. But the catastrophes of

(continued)
Strategy (Oxford, 1986); K. J. V. Jespersen, “Social Change and Military Revolution
in Early Modern Europe: Some Danish Evidence,” The Historical Journal XXVI
(1983); Bert S. Hall and Kelly R. Devries, “Review Essay – the ‘Military Revolution’
Revisited,” Technology and Culture (1990); George Raudzens, “War-Winning
Weapons: The Measurement of Technological Determinism in Military History,”
Journal of Military History (1990); David A. Parrott, “Strategy and Tactics in the
Thirty Years’ War: the ‘Military Revolution,'” Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen
(1985) (reprinted in Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate); Edward M. Furgol,
“Scotland Turned Sweden: The Scottish Covenanters and the Military Revolution,
1638-1651,” in J. Morrill, ed., The Scottish National Covenant in Its British Context
(Edinburgh, 1990); and Mahinder S. Kingra, “The trace italienne and the Military
Revolution during the Eighty Years’ War, 1567-1648,” Journal of Military History
(1993). One of the best surveys of the period remains Hans Delbriick, History of the
Art of War, vol. 4, The Dawn of Modern Warfare (Lincoln, NB, 1990).
For the context of Roberts’s claims for a Swedish military revolution, see his Gustavus
Adolphus: A History of Sweden, 1611-1632, II (London, 1958).

See particularly Clifford J. Rogers, “The Military Revolution in History and
Historiography,” in The Military Revolution Debate; see also Parker, “In Defense of
‘The Military Revolution,'” ibid.
The best introduction to the literature is Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate, but
see also William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power, Technology, Armed Force, and
Society Since A.D. 1000 (Chicago, 1982), for a wide-ranging discussion of the major
issues and trends; Jeremy Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815 (London, 1994) is also
worth consulting. On the specific processes on building the modern state through
military power see John A. Lynn, Giant of the Grand Steele: The French Army, 1610-
1715 (Cambridge, 1997) and Bruce D. Porter, War and the Rise of the Modern State
(New York, 1993).
See especially the 1929 work of V. K. Triandafillov, The Nature of Operations of
Modern Armies (London, 1994).

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Thinking about revolutions in warfare 3

1941 – in which the German Blitzkrieg came close to destroying the Soviet
Union – offered an unforgettable demonstration of the possibility of revo-
lutionary change in war.6 Soviet operational art belatedly recovered, and by
1945 had surpassed even the achievements of the Germans. From the late
1940s Soviet development of missile and nuclear systems likewise came to
rival that of the West.

Yet the appearance in the 1970s of striking new technologies within the
American armed forces – precision-guided munitions (PGMs), cruise mis-
siles, and stealth – suggested to Soviet thinkers that a further technological
revolution was taking place that had potentially decisive implications for
the Soviet Union. Given their close attention – grounded in ideology – to
material factors, the Soviets focused on the technological aspects of what
they perceived as an emerging “military-technical revolution.” Marshal
Nikolai V. Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet general staff from 1977 to 1984,
commented that these advances “ma[de] it possible to sharply increase (by
at least an order of magnitude) the destructive potential of conventional
weapons, bringing them closer, so to speak, to weapons of mass destruction
in terms of effectiveness.”7

From the Soviet perspective this was a particularly frightening pro-
spect. The new “smart” high-technology weapons that the American
armed forces were developing and deploying threatened the very bases
of Soviet operational art and of Soviet strategy: the immense armored
masses, deployed in depth and aimed at swiftly submerging NATO’s
outnumbered defenders.8 Analysis of the highly effective use the U.S.
Air Force had made of laser-guided bombs in the 1972. LINEBACKER
air campaigns undoubtedly heightened Soviet unease.9 That discomfiture

6 See among others V. G. Reznichenko, Taktika (Moscow, 1978), p. 9 of the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service translation in Joint Publications Research Service Report,
“Soviet Union, Military Affairs,” JPRS-UMA-88-008-L-1, 29 June 1988; and S. Davydov
and V. Chervonobab, “Conventional, but N o Less Dangerous,” Energiya: Ekonomika,
technika, ekologiya, no. 7, 1987.

7 Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union N . V. Ogarkov, “The Defense of Socialism:
Experience of History and the Present Day,” Krasnaya zvezda, 1st ed., 9 May 1984.

8 Soviet and East German planners envisaged reaching the French-Spanish border by
D+30-35; see especially Mark Kramer, trans., “Warsaw Pact Military Planning in
Central Europe: Revelations from the East German Archives,” Cold War International
History Project Bulletin, Issue 2 (1992), pp. 1, 13-19.

9 In the Gulf War of 1991, USAF aircraft used approximately 9,270 precision-guided
munitions (PGM) out of 227,100 expended. In the LINEBACKER campaigns, air force
aircraft had expended over 29,000 PGMs. The tactical emphasis of the LINEBACKER
campaigns had prevented American analysts from seeing anything revolutionary in the
greater accuracy of laser-guided bombs. The Soviets, who had access to the North
Vietnamese lessons-learned studies as well as the direct results of the Arab-Israeli
clashes, concluded otherwise. See Barry D. Watts, “American Air Power,” in Williamson
Murray, ed., The Emerging Strategic Environment: Challenges of the Twenty-first
Century (Westport, CT, 1999).

4 Murray and Knox

could only have grown as Soviet planners absorbed the implications of
the wide use of air defense suppression weapons and PGM by the Israeli
Air Force in the Yom Kippur War and in subsequent air battles against
the Soviet Union’s Arab proxies.10 At the same time the Soviets were
watching U.S. developments such as the “Assault Breaker” program,
which aimed at developing short-range ballistic missiles armed with
clouds of precision sub-munitions targeted – to the full depth of the
theater of war – against the follow-on echelons of any Red Army drive
toward the Channel and the Pyrenees. The ability to threaten and – if
opportunity arose – to conquer western Europe on the ground after
1944-45 n a d been the basis, even more than the nuclear arsenal
acquired from 1949 onward, of Soviet Russia’s world position. By the
1970s that position was in mortal peril.

Andrew W. Marshall and his Office of Net Assessment within the
Pentagon were the first to register the significance of Soviet writings
on “military-technical revolution.” From the mid-1980s through the
early 1990s, the commentaries on Soviet doctrine and on the concept
of “revolutions in military affairs” emerging from Net Assessment
proved increasingly influential within the U.S. defense community.11

Marshall and his office emphasized above all the conceptual and doc-
trinal, rather than the purely technological aspects of RMAs.I Z Net
Assessment’s explicit use of the term “revolution in military affairs”
instead of the Soviet “military-technical revolution” indeed aimed at
focusing the attention of the American armed forces on issues far
broader than technological change. Marshall also argued repeatedly
that the U.S. armed forces had not yet realized a revolution in military
affairs, but were in reality no further along than were the British in the
mid-1920s when they first began experimenting with armored and
mechanized warfare.13

10 See Barry D. Watts and Thomas A. Keany, Effects and Effectiveness, Report II, vol. 2,
The Gulf War Air Power Survey (Washington, DC, 1993), pp. 6 7 – 7 1 .

11 Marshall testified to Congress in 1995 that “available and foreseen technological
capabilities in areas such as PGMs, computing power, and surveillance systems could
transform war to the extent that occurred during the interwar period with armored
warfare, strategic bombing, and carrier aviation” (Andrew W. Marshall, “Revolutions
in Military Affairs,” Statement for the Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology,
Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 May 1995, p. 1).

12 The fact that the Office of Net Assessment was willing to support a number of
historically-based studies on military innovation during this period underlines this point.

13 Andrew W. Marshall, “Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions,” Office of Net
Assessment memorandum, 27 July 1993. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee Marshall made explicit that the creation of a revolution in military affairs is
inevitably a long process: “The term ‘revolution’ is not meant to insist that change will
be rapid – indeed past revolutions have unfolded over a period of decades – but only

(continued)

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Thinking about revolutions in warfare 5

America’s crushing victory in the Second Gulf War raised interest
throughout the U.S. armed forces in the revolutionary prospects of current
and foreseeable technologies to an almost uncontrollable pitch. But it also
had three decidedly negative consequences. First, the mastery seemingly
demonstrated in the Gulf revived the very worst feature of U.S. defense
culture: the recurring delusion that war can be understood and controlled
in the mechanized top-down fashion of Robert Strange McNamara and his
entourage in the 1960s.14 Second, victory provided the services with yet
another argument in favor of procurement of new and enormously costly
platforms such as the F-22, while unleashing claims from specialized pres-
sure groups such as the “info-war” community.15 Finally, victory through
technology appeared to promise the strategic freedom in the age of the
masses seemingly lost in the paddies and jungles of Vietnam. “Virtual
war” with minimal bloodshed could render unnecessary the presidential
leadership, military statesmanship, and popular commitment to the fight
that was seemingly in such short supply.

Advocates of U.S. leadership of a revolution in military affairs outside
the Office of Net Assessment made little effort to place this putative
future in some sort of historical perspective. Attempts to examine the
nature and limits of such revolutions in the past might – to the com-
mon-sense mind – appear to offer a means of gauging both the possibi-
lities and the pitfalls inherent in radical changes in war. The writings of
the enthusiasts have nevertheless displayed an astounding lack of histor-
ical consciousness.16

(continued)
that the change will be profound, that the new methods of warfare will be far
more powerful than the old. Innovations in technology make a military revolution
possible, but the revolution itself takes place only when new concepts of operations
develop and, in many cases, new military organizations are created. Making these
organizational and doctrinal changes is a long process” (Marshall, “Revolutions in
Military Affairs,” 5 May 1995). For an outsider’s review of the development of
thinking within the Pentagon see Thomas E. Ricks, “Warning Shot: How Wars Are
Fought Will Change Radically, Pentagon Planners Say,” The Wall Street Journal, 15
July 1994, p. A i .

14 See Williamson Murray, “Clausewitz Out, Computers In, Military Culture and
Technological Hubris,” The National Interest, Summer 1997. For a vivid snapshot of
the McNamara approach by two of his systems analysts, see Alain C. Enthoven and K.
Wayne Smith, How Much is Enought Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New
York, 1971).

15 On “platform fever,” see Williamson Murray, “Hard Choices: Fighter Procurement in
the Next Century,” The CATO Institute, Policy Analysis, paper no. 334 (Washington,
DC, 1999)-

16 One of the foremost proponents of the claim that history is irrelevant is James Blacker;
see in particular his “Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guioe to
America’s z i s t Century Defense,” Defense Working Paper No. 3 , Progressive Policy
Institute (Washington, DC, 1997), and “Crashing Through the Barricades,” Joint Forces
Quarterly, Summer 1997.

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6 Murray and Knox

P A T T E R N S A N D C O N C E P T S : M I L I T A R Y R E V O L U T I O N S

While Pentagon debates swirled around issues of immediate interest to the
services – such as which multibillion-dollar weapons platform might best
support the coming “revolution in military affairs” – historians had never-
theless begun to look beyond the seventeenth century for examples of revo-
lutionary military change. A paper delivered at the spring 1991 meeting of
the Society of Military History suggested that the history of Western mili-
tary institutions since the fourteenth century had involved periods of violent
change followed by periods of relative calm in which armies had adapted to
major changes in their environment, a pattern which evolutionary biolo-
gists have called punctuated equilibrium.17 Such an approach offers one –
admittedly metaphorical – way of understanding revolutionary change in
warfare.

The difficulties inherent in understanding the pattern of past revolutions
arise from the enormous complexities, ambiguities, and uncertainties in the
historical record. The two distinct concepts already sketched out best
describe radical military innovation.18 The first and most far-reaching in
consequences is the military revolution. Its defining feature is that it funda-
mentally changes the framework of war. Five military revolutions have had
that effect in Western history:

– the creation in the seventeenth century of the modern nation-state,
which rested on the large-scale organization of disciplined military
power;

– the French Revolution of the late eighteenth century, which merged
mass politics and warfare;

– the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth century and after,
which made it possible to arm, clothe, feed, pay, and move swiftly to
battle the resulting masses;

– the First World War, which combined the legacies of the French and
Industrial Revolutions and set the pattern for twentieth-century war;

– the advent of nuclear weapons, which contrary to all precedent kept
the Cold War cold in the decisive European and northeast Asian
theaters.

These five upheavals are best understood through a geological metaphor:
they were earthquakes. They brought systemic changes in politics and

17 The paper eventually received the Moncado Prize from the Society of Military History
for the best article in the Journal of Military History in 1994. For its most recent
iteration see Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War,” in
Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate.

18 The remarks that follow draw particularly on discussions at the conference at Quantico
in 1996 mentioned in the acknowledgments, and on the work of Cliff Rogers.

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Thinking about revolutions in warfare 7

society. They were uncontrollable, unpredictable, and unforeseeable. And
their impact continues. The leaders of North Vietnam in their wars against
French and Americans drew inspiration from the French Revolution (and its
Bolshevik and Maoist progeny) as well as from Vietnamese nationalism.19

Those who expect the “information revolution” – if it is indeed a revolu-
tion – to bring radical military change will consequently find the direction,
consequences, and implications of any change that may result to be largely
unpredictable.

Military revolutions recast society and the state as well as military orga-
nizations. They alter the capacity of states to create and project military
power. And their effects are additive. States that have missed the early
military revolutions cannot easily leap-frog to success in war by adopting
the trappings of Western technology. Oil bought Saddam Hussein fabulous
quantities of Soviet, French, and American hardware. But hardware alone
could not confer battlefield effectiveness on forces conscripted from a
society that possessed neither a modern state, nor the solidarity and resi-
lience generated through mass politics, nor the breadth and depth of tech-
nological skill common throughout societies that had passed through the
Industrial Revolution. Whereas the Vietnamese Communist movement,
which combined the revolutionary fervor of the French Revolution (derived
equally from its French colonial masters and its Muscovite and Chinese
patrons) with a bureaucratically organized and profoundly xenophobic
traditional culture, defeated one Western great power and one superpower.

The first of the five great military revolutions introduced a degree of
order and predictability into an activity – war – that since the collapse of
Rome had largely been the province of anarchic improvisation.
Governments – insofar as the personal entourages of kings and princes
merited that name – had with few exceptions exercised only the loosest
control over armies and fleets. Employers frequently failed to pay their
troops; subsistence through pillage was the usual result. In 1576, the unpaid
soldiers of the Spanish monarchy mutinied and sacked the great city of
Antwerp – an action that wrecked Spanish policy in the Netherlands and
advanced the cause of the rebellious Dutch. The mutiny reflected both the
inherent indiscipline of the soldiery and the inability of the financially
decrepit Spanish state to compensate them for their sacrifices. Similar epi-
sodes recurred throughout the Thirty Years’ War that devastated Germany
and central Europe from 1618 onward.

But other powers tamed disorder. The Swedish Articles of War of the
early seventeenth century made clear that soldiers would dig when they

19 General William Westmoreland was as little acquainted with the history of the French
Revolution as with that of East Asia; it is therefore unsurprising that he botched the
conduct of the war in South Vietnam.

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8 Murray and Knox

were told to dig – an uncommon notion up to that point. Impersonal mili-
tary discipline focused upon the state made European military organiza-
tions of the mid- to late seventeenth century infinitely more effective on the
battlefield than the feudal levies, mercenary companies, and haphazardly
organized hostilities-only forces that they replaced. And the new disciplined
military instruments were self-reinforcing: they backed with force the sta-
te’s collection of the taxes needed to pay the troops regularly. In return for
pay, the state could and did demand that its soldiers maintain a disciplined
obedience in garrison as well as on the battlefield; Western societies could
thenceforth take for granted the order and responsiveness of their military
institutions. That was indeed a revolution, as the consequences of its
absence in Latin America …


The Purpose and Basics of the H100 “Critical Review”

1. The requirement is a short review (400-500 words). Please note that the review is due by 0830 on the day of class for H111.

1. Each review is worth 20% of the total written assessment grade for H100 (60%).

1. The review focuses on the specific article assigned for H111:


ANALYSE
H111: Jonathan Bailey, “The First World War and the Birth of Modern Warfare,” in The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001,
PAGE
132-153.

Structure and Format of the “Critical Reviews”

Using the components of the critical review (introduction, main body, conclusion), the student will answer the following four questions:

            1. What is the author’s thesis?

            2. What evidence does the author use to support their argument?

            3. Is the argument persuasive?

            4.  How does the argument shape your view of your profession and its history?

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