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The broach foreign policy bureaucracy to successfully formulate and implement a particular foreign policy program. 

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Analysis
and
Evaluation

80 to >71.0 pts

Advanced

The topic is clearly
and critically
analyzed as part of a
comprehensive
discussion.
Contextual factors
are considered, key
terms are defined,
complex issues are
navigated with
precision and
nuance, and relevant
research is used.

71 to >55.0 pts

Proficient

The topic is unevenly
considered and
analyzed, and/or some
aspects of context,
terminology,
awareness of
complexity, the need
for nuanced
understanding, or
relevant research are
lacking.

55 to >0.0 pts

Developing

The topic is unevenly
considered and
analyzed, and/or some
aspects of context,
terminology, awareness
of complexity, the need
for nuanced
understanding, or
relevant research are
lacking.

0 pts

Not Present

Not discussed.

80 pts

Synthesizes
Knowledge
Clearly and
Coherently

50 to >44.0 pts

Advanced

The introduction,
conclusion, and body
of the paper all
evidence a clear and
coherent
understanding of the
broader issues
involved in the topic.

44 to >33.0 pts

Proficient

The introduction,
conclusion, and body
of the paper all
evidence a clear and
coherent
understanding of the
broader issues
involved in the topic.

33 to >0.0 pts

Developing

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coherence of the paper
are fundamentally
lacking.

0 pts

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or coherence to the
paper.

50 pts

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8 to >6.0 pts

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6 to >0.0 pts

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appropriate use.

0 pts

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conclusion and / or
no sources.

10 pts

Midterm Essay: The Presidency, the Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy
Grading Rubric | PPOG540_D01_202140

Criteria Ratings Points

Grammar
and Spelling

40 to >35.0 pts

Advanced

The argument,
evidence, and
conclusion of the
essay are written
with few grammar,
spelling, or
punctuation errors.
Voice and person are
used correctly. Word
choice is adequate.

35 to >27.0 pts

Proficient

The argument,
evidence, and
conclusion of the essay
are partially obscured
by several grammar,
spelling, or punctuation
errors. Voice and
person are used
correctly. Word choice
is adequate.

27 to >0.0 pts

Developing

Grammar, spelling, or
punctuation errors are
persistent. Voice and
person are used
inconsistently. Writing
style is understandable
but needs significant
improvement. Word
choice can be
improved.

0 pts

Not Present

Numerous spelling,
grammar, or
punctuation errors
are present. Voice
and person are
misused. Writing
style is difficult to
understand. Word
choice is poor.

40 pts

Turabian
Format

20 to >17.0 pts

Advanced

Citations and format
are in current
Turabian style. Cover
page, Table of
Contents,
Appendices, and
Bibliography are
correctly formatted.
Paper is
double-spaced with
1-inch margins and
written in 12 point
Times New Roman
font.

17 to >13.0 pts

Proficient

Citations and format
are in current Turabian
style with few errors.
Cover page, Table of
Contents, Appendices,
and Bibliography are
present with few errors.
Paper is
double-spaced with
1-inch margins and
written in 12 point
Times New Roman
font.

13 to >0.0 pts

Developing

Citations and format
are in current Turbian
style though several
errors are present.
Cover page, Table of
Contents, Appendices,
and Bibliography are
included though several
errors are present.
Paper is
double-spaced, but
margins or fonts are
incorrect.

0 pts

Not Present

Citations are not
formatted correctly.
Cover page, Table
of Contents,
Appendices, and
Bibliography are
not included or not
formatted correctly.
Paper is not
double-spaced,
margins are
incorrect, or font is
incorrect.

20 pts

Total Points: 200

Midterm Essay: The Presidency, the Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy
Grading Rubric | PPOG540_D01_202140

Midterm Essay: The Presidency, the Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy Assignment Instructions

Overview

Our Module 4: Week 4 assignment focuses on the challenges Presidents face in dealing with Executive Branch bureaucracies. In this assignment you will explore and discuss how the presidency and bureaucracy conduct USFP planning and implementation. Dimensions to evaluate are presidential personality, management style, and relations with foreign policy and national security bureaucracies like the National Security Council, State Department, Defense Department, and the CIA.

Instructions

The National Security Council and broader Executive Branch bureaucracy – e.g., State Department, Defense, and the CIA – officially serve the President’s foreign policy agenda. Drawing from Chapters 7 and 8, video presentations, and your own research, offer a critical assessment of at least three different challenges any president faces in working with the NSC and the broach foreign policy bureaucracy to successfully formulate and implement a particular foreign policy program. Provide enough clarity and examples from both chapters and other sources used to defend your three challenges.

· Write a quality 1,500-word research paper addressing the above prompt.

· The paper must be in current Turabian style. The paper must include a title page and reference page also in current Turabian format.

· You must include citations to a sufficient number of appropriate scholarly sources to fully support your assertions and conclusions. Each paper must contain at least 5-7 scholarly sources original to this paper and not including the course textbook.

Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the Turnitin plagiarism tool.

1. Watch: The Presidency & the Bureaucracy

Welcome to module for the presidency and the bureaucracy. This week the focus is on the presidency and the bureaucracy as they relate to making US foreign policy. Naturally will only scratch the surface. But for the precedent, this means discussing the constitutional mandate. The commander-in-chief and Head of State. In the area of US foreign policy, the President has a number of options to act. First, he’s really the point person for the agenda he wishes to set with his administration. But precedence can also issue executive memorandums of agreement, statements, and orders. These can all be more or less binding depending on the political contexts. It’s real or perceived importance. And whether congressional approval, opposition, or oversight require the President to somehow alter, modify, or even suspend such commitments. It’s also possible that presidential agreements, statements, and orders can at times be more symbolic than substantive or differently.

A more formal way of affirming longstanding policies and practices of previous administrations. In some cases, presidential agreement statements in orders may carry over into the next presidential administration unless opposed by the new president. On other occasions as more recently with President Trump, the new president may wish to either ignore or continue observing the letter or the spirit of previous agreement statements and orders. On yet still other occasions, a president can issue an order that is more difficult for a future president to undo. Like President Trump’s decision to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Whatever the case here, the President as options that cross over into foreign policy. As much as domestic politics. Naturally, the President has broad spending powers within the context of the foreign policy bureaucracies that serve him. And these include the state and defense departments, the CIA and other intelligence agencies, the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture to departments Homeland Security and the Office of Management and Budget. All of these have significant footprints in US foreign policy agendas. Among other powers the president has is the appointment of ambassadors, as well as the discretionary authorization of the use of force. However different, this may look to large, small, or secretive operations. All of this adds up to significant administrative, military, and political power.

Assuming a president knows how to use it. And if necessary, to overcome bureaucratic and congressional efforts at sabotage, delay, or outright opposition. Perhaps the most important allies the President has in policy-making are the National Security Council and other voices associated with the policy making process, including the National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. Along with these critical influences, the vice president, US Trade Representative, and White House Chief of Staff, along with the First Lady, may all play important roles in getting the President’s ear on major and minor aspects of US foreign policy. While the US foreign policy bureaucracy as ostensibly serve behest of the president, each department or agency has a history as an independent organization and an institutional culture with its own mission, goals, governance, and professional code of honor. If the State Department, Defense Department, the CIA, commerce, or DHS, are committed to assist the President achieve his or her policy objectives. It should come as no surprise to see that pockets of resistance to presidential agendas will naturally emerge from these sectors given their independent institutional culture of long-term professional staffs with ideas and agendas of the row. However, independent such institutional cultures may be as part of the US foreign policy bureaucracy. Most consider it a professional duty to help the President achieve his or her policy priorities. No doubt, all of this looks neat on an organizational chart. But it should come as little surprise to recognize that despite the appearance of rationality and order, a process of making US foreign policy as a product of presidential demand can be quite uneven, and that is the polite version. Finally, note the over the horizon issues in each chapter Have a great week.

2. Watch: The National Security Council Interagency Process

The best way for policy options to come up through the system do the President is through the process that we call the inter-agency decades ago. I think it was easier to say. This is an issue for the Defense Department. This is an issue for the treasury. This is for an issue for the state department. There is a notion now that there are many players that are required to deal and solve a problem, and they need to be all pulling in the same direction. And that of course, is the coordination function that’s at the essence of what’s called the inner agency process. All the agencies of government who have equities in any particular interest meet at a much lower level initially than the precedent. If there’s a difference of opinion that requires higher level deliberations, they would bump it up a level.

A I enjoyed reading the interagency process, trying to get what I used to call the highest common denominator out of the process that the lowest. If we could agree on 80%, that was something the President didn’t have to decide whether or not the President gets actually physically involved is a matter of judgment. One of the most valuable things the President has his time and any time that you waste his time that can’t be spent doing other things. One of the more effective processes we had was when the President decided to change our strategy in Iraq and increase our troop presence there. We had a deputies committee that was working options doing analysis, what a brewer assumption in Iraq, how those assumptions change. And then you had in parallel to that, using that information, a conversation that the President conducted with his national security principles. There was a disagreement as to what we should be doing. The President wanted to have a process where we understood the basis for those disagreements. But he also wanted to, through his questioning to try to bring his national security principles together because he was changing strategy in a middle of a war. In order to do that, he needed to carry the country with him. And the key thing about carrying the country was it going to be carried first his own advisers and then carry the military leadership who were fighting this war. That was the kind of process where we had a good blending of interagency work to develop options and then real engagement between the President and his senior leadership to come to a decision that in the end of the day, only the president could make.

3. Watch: Running a National Security Council Meeting

An NSC meeting can be called for a variety. Res, Iraq invaded Kuwait. That’s a crisis you call an NSC, meaning to evaluate the situation. You call an NSC meeting when a study has been prepared. That as controversial elements, you call it when the President wants one to discuss an issue. Any decision-making process has to fit the president. And the way he likes to receive information processes and make decisions. And different presidents like to do it in different way. President Nixon, for example, didn’t much like meetings. He like papers. He liked to read papers and studying them, make decisions that way. President Ford, on the other hand, love to hear his advisers debating the issues that helped him refine his own thinking and make decisions. So it needs to be tailored for the president because if the president doesn’t find it useful, It’s not going to be useful. We talk through the most difficult operational issues what to do about the Iran nuclear program. What do about the Syrian nuclear reactor? We could talk through those in a situation of complete candor. People could explain their views without concern that they would show up in the newspaper. What you want is with great stability, real disagreement of views vetted in front of the president.

A president then makes a decision. And everybody is clear on what is the way forward. That’s the system when it’s working right now for the NFC to function well, there has to be collaboration asked to be compromise, but at the same time, there has to be disagreement. And sometimes it can be it can be rough. I made people have strong views. Defense always wants to protect as much as it can. State always wanted to do diplomacy. The president needs to cut the budget. Congress is speeding up and everybody. So, you can have some very testy discussions. And those fascinating, I love those meetings because strong views shouted back and forth across the table. And I got to say this is what I’m going to recommend to the President.

4. Watch: Reforming the National Security Council: What’s Necessary?

Welcome to today’s Council on Foreign Relations meeting on reforming the National Security Council. And I’d also like to welcome the members around the country and the world listening via live stream. I’m Karen Liang and I write about national security for the Washington Post. But most importantly, we’re fortunate today to have as our speakers, three people have personal and academic experience in the national security sphere, and specifically, the National Security Council operates. Ambassador Robert Blackwell joins us via video from importers in New York, where he is a Henry Kissinger Senior Fellow for US foreign policy, is worth multiple time zones. Nsc staff most recently as NSC. And as you can see in his lengthy biography in the program Ambassador back, Blackwell has also had a long and distinguished career as a diplomat, an academic, and an author of books and papers on virtually every area of wooden house. Eva became president of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2013. After more than four years as the Obama administration’s ambassador to NATO. Before US government service, he was a senior fellow at Brookings Institution where he specialized in American foreign policy and the transatlantic relationship. Mac Dassler, to my right, teaches Public Policy at the University of Maryland and has advised presidents and secretaries of state on economic and foreign policy and held senior research positions at some of our most distinguished think tanks. He has authored a lot of books, including with Ambassador adult or one that is particularly pertinent to our conversation here today. In the shadow of the Oval Office, published in 2009, was a combination of a decade of work that they did together, including the compilation of oral histories of officials who served on the NSC staff and related rates of presidents from JFK through George W Bush. The book itself as a historical analysis of national security advisors who serve those precedence, what they did, how they did it, and their recommendations for how the role should be undertaken. It gets work that’s been invaluable to many, certainly in my position and probably for many years. So, with that, let’s get started. As you know, this session is on the record, will talk for a bit among ourselves and then we’ll open the floor to questions. So our title today is reforming the NSC and that assumes that it needs reform. I have to say that the need to change the way it operates as a new administration takes over is not in and of itself a new concept. Under Jimmy Carter. Some thought the National Security Adviser was too powerful. And under Ronald Reagan, the NSC was seen as disorganized and to operational two-week under George W Bush, too big and powerful under Barack Obama. So I’d like to start with Ambassador back. Well, you’ve worked for a number of national security council president’s. What is it that makes a good National Security Advisor and an effective, smooth running NSC. Well, good morning everybody. And good to be with you. Well, let me put it like this. I think many in Washington and in the audience would regard the model for National Security Advisor as Brent Scowcroft. And so and I worked for brand. So let me just say, how did Brandt do the job? Well, first of all, the National Security Advisor obviously has to have a close relationship with the President. Has to have a temperament that is congenial to the president. He doesn’t necessarily, by the way, have to know the president when he takes his position as National Security Advisor. Curiously, Henry Kissinger, it hadn’t 15-minute meeting with Richard Nixon at a cocktail party before he was offered the job. So, but he certainly over time has to have that relationship. Second, and of course we assume it has to be very smart. But second, it’s a big management job because getting before the President, decisions he needs to make. And then being sure the decisions he makes are implemented is a big management job. And some of the NSC advisors who haven’t done all that well, haven’t, because they concentrated on their substantive advice to the President at the expense of their management role. And third, and this may even be the most important. He asked to have a temperament, a non disputations temperament. If I have to put it if I can put it like that, because he needs to be or she needs to be able instinctively to be fair minded in presenting options to the president. Of course, the president, least in my experience, will usually ask the NSC advise, Well, what do you think? But that’s after the NSC by adviser. At best and, and this was certainly brand would present to the President in a fair-minded way the various options that various members of the cabinet supported. So just to conclude, this is a very tough and challenging job. And it’s because of that, that I suppose two-thirds of the National Security Advisers since the Kennedy years have actually failed in their, in their job and have been replaced or quit. In addition to the personality and the National Security Advisor, obviously the structure is very important on one of the first things every administration has done in the last half century is to produce a document right at the beginning, talking about how national security policy-making will be structured, how the process is going to work. I know Eva, you participated in that process for President Obama. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about how that works and how important it is. So in part in order to do the job in the way that, that Bob has described it, you need to have a process in an organization that facilitates, that’s particularly that last point. The ability to understand what other people and other agencies think and then how to present what they think and an objective and trust and trust fulfilling manner to the president. And over the course of the last 50 years, the way in which that process has been put together by presence has changed. Except that since Brent Scowcroft in 1989 actually coming out of commission report that he chaired as a result of the Iran-Contra affair. We’ve had a relatively similar kind of structure. A structure where you have a Principles Committee that is chaired by the National Security Advisor and whose members are all the members of the National Security Council minus the president and sometimes the Vice President. And so you have the senior cabinet figures coming together on a regular basis, chaired by, by the President’s National Security Advisor. You then have the, the, the deputies committee, which is the number twos and most of the departments sometimes a number three depending on what department you’re talking about that is trying to manage the process almost on a day-to-day basis. And it’s the crisis management facility, a facilitator. And then third, you have, and this is where it changes from administration to administration. Should’ve had the Assistant Secretary level interagency working groups which get renamed to under every president because that’s the President’s prerogative. So currently the inter-agency policy committees, IP sees that it sometimes get chaired by departments and sometimes get chaired by, by the NSC. There’s always a big fight about that issue on whether department gets to chair it. Over time. The reality is, is because the central mechanism is in the White House, it tends to be chaired by, by the NSC. So even in the Obama administration, where initially there was that, What was it called? Psd one, the first memorandum by the President laid out the interagency process. There was some thought being given at the State Department, either chairing a coach, sharing some of the regional eyepieces. That’s never happened was pretty much abandoned pretty early on. It for one simple reason, the assistant secretaries you were supposed to chair those meetings aren’t actually confirmed until 67 months into an administration. So somebody’s gotta do the job and the person and the NSC is going to be there on day one because they don’t have to be confirmed assuming that they had been appointed. That will be there on day one. So those are the those are the big decisions that you make. And for every administration, the question is, do we have the same process or do we have a different process of interagency management? I would I would suggest that that’s one part, but that does not need reform. It can work. There’s a question about how many meetings you do and how frequently they are and how you run them. That was actually less a process or an organizational one more process question. And then there is a larger issue which we may want to get into later. What is the competence that the NSC covers vis-a-vis all the other issues that are out there, whether it’s international economic issues or counterterrorism issues and homeland security issues. And that, of course, this is an issue that is right now being debated within the Trump transition team. Bob, an IPO, have done an admirable job of setting forth both the role of the National Security Advisor and of the structure, the formal structure that has developed and has persisted for the last, yes, we’re talking 30 years now in 1986. 1987 for that. But of course, driving a lot of this and sometimes distorting it is the development of the role of the president and the relationship of the President to the National Security Advisor. And these, we have a book we could recommend food. Look at that. But basically, I’ll say guys, this is varied enormously from president to president. And it often defeats the dreams of reformers. Example, right at the beginning of the Obama administration, there was perhaps an unusual amount of ferment in the national security community wanted to improve the process. Impressive reports were multi-hundred page reports were written. Big structure. A lot of people wanted to return to the way President Eisenhower ran the NSC back of the 950 is which had a fair amount to recommended. Only problem was I remember and apparently General Jones, the first Obama Nash security. But it has some interest in this. However, essentially the president did not. And the President and General Jones never hit it off in the sense that he respected General Jones, General Jones and respected in the President and all this. But they never hit off in terms of the day-to-day policy management relationships. And the people who were, who had worked for Obama for a long time, that political aids, the policies and the White House essentially jumped into the vacuum and got, as well as the depth that then deputy Tom Donaldson, who essentially did a lot of the National Security Advisor job until that was changed. So you find episodes where the structure is one way and the personal relationships don’t work out. And therefore they get, and it’s since the President is dominant. Now we’re all particularly recognizing that right now with a somewhat unusual president about to take office. But point I would make is, for every president there is, there are idiosyncrasies. There are different style preferences and they tend to shape how the process operates. The, Before we go to the specifics of, of what’s happening now, I wanted to talk a little bit about the size of the NSC staff. Brent Scowcroft said that his was about 50 people and he thought that Yes, just about right. But it’s pretty much doubled in every administration since then. To the point where you had more than 400 people working on the NSC staff in the Obama White House. Arguably, many of those were not policy people there. They need a lot more technicians and they used to There’s an administrative staff, but there were a lot of policy people there. The administration has said it’s worked to make it smaller. And in fact, congress has moved with legislation in the NBA this year to mandate some argument over whether they actually have the power to do that. But anyway, they’ve done it in legislation that it can’t be more than 200 people. How important is that? I mean, the size dictate function. This function dictates size, is it, does it make a big difference? Let me jump in on that. And that Eva will also maybe at the very top, on the very top handful of issues. Probably not very much because those are handled by the President of the chief people, the secretaries, the deputy secretaries and so forth. What I think where I think it does matter isn’t a lot of other issues. Most of these, if you have couple of 100 policy people which the Obama had and administration had until at least near the end of the administration. Most of them never see the President except maybe to shake his hand when they’re hired and when they’re fire. And they don’t know the president. But and most of them don’t have any real relationship with the National Security Advisor. But they have a mandate to work in their policy areas and they’re aggressive. People who were interested making a difference. So they take initiative, so they try to control what goes glow. So as a result, you have, it increases the difficulty of people in the agencies being able to take initiatives and lead and connect effectively with the National Security Advisor. And it makes it. But because there’s still only one security advisor when President one Kevin level, it creates a bottleneck because all these people are generating ideas and they’re mostly good I, good people. I mean, they’re active, they care. They’ve come to get them because they want to make a difference. But I think just in that sense, the large number is the enemy of the good and the Scowcroft idea with evil. And I wrote a piece and in 2000 for Brookings, which we basically said, we think 40 to 50 is about right now that did not include Homeland Security. So if you add that, it makes it a little bigger. But clearly with under W Bush and then under Barack Obama, it’s got a lot bigger though evil may want to speak to so very recent changes. So a couple of points on it. First, the idea that Congress should legislate presidential staff in the White House. They may or may not be allowed to do it, but it is not a wise thing to do. The president should be able to choose how he. Sometime, someday, she gets advice from the people that he or she wants to get advice from. And it’s not for Congress to decide it. It’s number 12. In terms of policy staff. You’ve written carrying that the National Security Council under Susan Rice has actually, for the first time really, since Brent Scowcroft said, let’s look at what’s the right size of this organization. And they’ve taken a very serious look at, at how many people do they need and they’ve cut the staff quite dramatically, particularly on the policy on the policy side. So it’s now under the soon to be mandated to 100 policy professional staff. They’ve also tried to figure out how to streamline the process by which decisions are made. And Clinton principal meetings and deputies meetings, which were sort of overtaking the day-to-day responsibilities off principles and deputies around through the departments. Third, just to echo. Max, last point is the more people you have, the more busy they will be on issues that they shouldn’t be busy. Um, and, and the, the core thought that everybody should wake up with from the National Security Advisor until the lowest policy person is at, is what I am concerned about something the President ought to be or is interested in? Absolutely, yeah, and if the answer is no, then don’t worry about it. Let somebody else trigger it out. You have an entire bureaucracy that is, that exist for the very purpose of worrying about the things that the President doesn’t or shouldn’t worry about. And staff should only worry about the things that the president is or should be an underscore, should be concerned about. And when you have 506075, make it a 100 people, you probably got enough to cover that broad range of issues with, again, the caveat, depending on how broad range of issues it doesn’t include trade policy, doesn’t include your domestic homeland security and disaster response policy. So the larger the remit of the NSC, the larger the staff will be. A key organizational decision that the President needs to make very early on in the administration. Do you, Bob, you’ve seen this from the inside through several administrations. What’s your view about, about the size, size, dictating function or a function dictating size. What difference does it make from the inside? All let me first say I agree entirely with what has just been said. In every respect. I just observe there doesn’t seem to be an obvious relationship between the size of the NSC staff and the quality of the policies that the President is following. It may even be an inverse relationship. But if we think of the late great **** new stamp President’s get the kind of the organizations they want. And so this president will get the kind of organization he wants through his National Security Advisor. And whether that errs on the side of larger or smaller item think really matters all that much. As long as it’s reasonable. I don’t think 400 is reasonable because it has the effect, as my colleagues have said, of getting NSC staffers, quote, on behalf of the President, involved in policies that no president would be interested in. So I think I have about a 100 is right. Could be a little more, little less, but certainly not as large as it is banned in recent administrations. So when we don’t, we don’t know a lot about what President-Elect Trump wants from his national security staff. What we do now is that he has already changed the structure somewhat. At least we know that from appointments that have been made, not because there has been any structural documents released, but he has apparently revived the separate homeland Security Council, which the Obama administration subsumed into the, into the NSC. He has elevated the National Economic Council. He has created the National Trade Council. And he’s appointed heads of all of these in the White House. All of whom report directly to him, and presumably all of them have staffs. And so I wonder what any of you think about what that says, about how smoothly the system’s going to run, what his interests are and how he intends to pursue them through the White House. I’ll make two points. First, on the issue of the Homeland Security Council. The Homeland Security Council exists in the Obama administration. The Council, which is a group of people with meats at the principal level and can meet with the President and is chaired at the principal’s level by the Homeland Security Advisor. Today. We don’t know yet whether the change. So the appointment, I guess it’s Tom boss or as the new Homeland Security Advisor as assistant to the President for Homeland Security Affairs and counter-terrorism. So same title as Lisa Monaco has today, but doesn’t she’s still report three says no, she doesn’t. She reports directly to the president. But This is where it changes, a change that the Obama administration made us, they abolished and Homeland Security Council staff and merged it with the NSC. So the question is, are we going to have a separate staff dealing with homeland security, counter-terrorism, and cybersecurity. There is a cybersecurity staff under the CIO in in the White House today? That we don’t know, but we just don’t know how that is going to happen. The larger point is exactly your point that on the big issues dealing with the international affairs, ranging from Homeland Security through national security to economic affairs and trade. We are now going to have four individuals who are all in the White House directly reporting to the president. Then the question is, who’s going to coordinate the coordinators? Because these are for people who are going to be coordinating various parts of the government. And then they have to coordinate with themselves. Because strangely enough, foreign economic policy and trade policy or not, that’s different. And many of our national security and foreign policy issues involve both trade and counter-terrorism, et cetera. So the coordination of the coordination function is within the White House, is a recipe for more staff. Because who’s going to coordinate the coordinators? More staff, obviously, and a recipe for potential conflict. Now, everything we know about Donald Trump’s management style through the …







Author: Glenn P. Hastedt

Dateline: Trump’s First 100 Days

Presidential performance can be judged by any of a number of different standards. One that continues to be embraced is what they accomplished during their first 100 days. This builds on a sense of high expectations (and sometimes fear) that a newly elected president will move quickly to implement campaign promises. Let’s compare Donald Trump and Barack Obama’s first 100 days of making foreign policy.

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Immediately after his inauguration, Donald Trump moved to implement some of his foreign policy campaign promises. On January 23, 2017, he signed a presidential memorandum withdrawing the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. On his sixth day in office, January 25, Trump signed an executive order directing the Department of Homeland Security to begin constructing a wall along the U.S.–Mexico border. The source of funding for the wall was not specified. The following day, he tweeted that “if Mexico is unwilling to pay for the badly needed wall, the, it would be better to cancel the upcoming meeting [with Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto].” Nieto cancels the meeting. On January 27, 2017, Trump issued Executive Order 1379, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry in the United States.” More commonly known as the Muslim ban, it lowered the number of refugees that were to be admitted to the United States and suspended entry of individuals from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The policy was quickly challenged in the courts, and in early February the administration stopped enforcing it. A revised ban issued in March was also challenged successfully in the courts. In March, on his 68th day as president, Trump reversed a series of environmental policies intended to combat climate change.

Trump held a series of meetings with foreign leaders at Mar-a-Lago. One, with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, was interrupted by news of a North Korean ballistic missile test. Another, with Chinese President Xi Jinping, occurred the same day that Trump authorized air strikes in Syria in response to its use of chemical weapons. This decision reversed a campaign pledge not to get involved in the Syrian conflict. Trump would also reverse his position on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, and no longer referred to it as obsolete. After meeting with Xi, he stated that China was not a currency manipulator and raised the possibility of moving away from a one-China policy.

In addition to the authorization of Syrian air strikes, the Trump administration engaged in other military actions during its first 100 days. On January 29, the United States carried out an information-gathering military raid in Yemen, in which a U.S. Navy SEAL and several civilians were killed. The Trump administration called it a success, and asserted that it had been under consideration by Obama in December. Initial assessments challenged the conclusion that new intelligence was obtained or that it had been approved by the Obama administration. In early April, the administration announced that the USS Carl Vinson supercarrier had been repositioned in the western Pacific Ocean in response to North Korea’s test firing of a ballistic missile. “We are sending an armada,” said Trump. The announcement proved inaccurate, as the USS Carl Vinson was in the Indian Ocean at the time.

Trump’s national security system began a series of changes that would become frequent during his first two years as president. Retired General Michael Flynn, his first National Security Advisor, resigned after twenty-four days for having misled Vice President Mike Pence about a 164conversation with Russia’s ambassador concerning economic sanctions placed by the Obama administration. He told a former business partner that the new administration would “rip up” the sanctions.

The mystique surrounding a president’s first 100 days in office began with the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 at the height of the Depression. In his first 100 days, Congress passed fifteen major pieces of legislation as part of the New Deal economic recovery program. FDR also began his famous series of radio fireside chats during that time. First 100 days’ performance since then has been spotty, especially in the area of foreign policy. Dwight Eisenhower concentrated on ending the Korean War; in his presidential campaign he had pledged to bring it to an end, and actually went to Korea weeks after being elected. Richard Nixon went on a five-country tour of Europe, announced the end of the draft, and stated that the United States would deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system in his first 100 days. Jimmy Carter announced that he was pardoning Vietnam draft evaders. Bill Clinton announced a controversial plan to allow gays to serve in the military. George W. Bush announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Kyoto Climate Accord. For details on John F. Kennedy’s first 100 days in office, see the Historical Lesson.

Historical Lesson

John F. Kennedy’s First 100 Days

John Kennedy’s first 100 days in office were among the most active insofar as foreign policy was concerned. The results were both good and bad. Kennedy was inaugurated on January 21, 1961. Three days later he announced that, via an executive order, he was establishing the Peace Corps as a pilot program, naming George McGovern as its director. Congress would be asked to establish it on a permanent basis.

On February 22, Kennedy sent a letter to Nikita Khrushchev, head of the Soviet Communist Party, in which he extended an invitation to hold personal talks on foreign policy matters of interest to both countries. Earlier, Khrushchev had sent Kennedy a congratulatory letter following the election. Kennedy’s advisors urged him not to hold such a meeting. They feared that he would misread Khrushchev’s personality and intentions. [The meeting was held in Vienna in June, after the 100-day period, with Berlin and Laos as the major points of discussion. Initially the summit was seen as a diplomatic success, but that assessment soon changed. Kennedy did not fare well in the private discussions, and Khrushchev appears to have come away from the summit with the view that Kennedy was an inexperienced leader who could be outmaneuvered.]

In March, Kennedy announced an ambitious ten-year plan for economic growth and development in the Western Hemisphere. A central feature of the plan was an economic partnership between the United States and Latin American countries. This partnership became the Alliance for Progress, which officially came into existence in August 1961. The short-term impact of the Alliance for Progress was significant, as the amount of U.S. foreign aid to the region virtually tripled. Long-term assessments were not as positive, as much of the money flowing into the region benefited U.S. corporations that returned profits to the United States rather than local economies.

The most significant foreign policy decision made by Kennedy in his first 100 days came in April 1961, when he approved the Bay of Pigs operation. It called for covert training of Cuban exiles into a paramilitary force. The force would secretly be sent back to Cuba, where it would help spawn a popular uprising designed to overthrow Castro. The plan was developed by the CIA during the Eisenhower administration’s final year in office. During the 1960 presidential campaign, both Kennedy and Richard Nixon called for taking a hard-line stance against Castro, with Kennedy asserting that Eisenhower had not done enough to end his rule. Kennedy was elected president on November 8, 1960, and on November 18 he was briefed on the invasion plan. On January 3, 1961, the Eisenhower administration broke diplomatic relations with Cuba. Kennedy was briefed again on January 28, 1961. At these briefings he called for changes in the invasion plan, one of which was to move the landing to the Bay of Pigs in order to further hide its link to the United States. At an April 12 press conference, when asked what the United States would do to help support anti-Castro Cubans, Kennedy said that the United States had no intention of intervening in Cuban affairs.

The Bay of Pigs invasion took place on April 17, 1961. Little went right. Overwhelmed by Cuban military forces, the U.S.-backed Cubans quickly surrendered. When confronted with news of the invasion’s imminent collapse, Kennedy rejected calls to openly provide additional U.S. assistance. The failure was not a surprise to many. Both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense had voiced their doubts about the CIA plan, as did former Secretary of State Dean Acheson and current members of Kennedy’s State Department.

Applying the Lesson

1. What standard should be used in assessing presidential performance in the first 100 days, and why?

2. How deeply should presidents be involved in the decision-making process? Explain your answer.

3. What is more important in the first 100 days of a presidency: continuity with the past or changing the direction of foreign policy? Explain your answer.

The historical record suggests that focusing too heavily on a president’s first 100 days is not necessarily a good indicator of what foreign policy is to come in the 1,361 days that follow. However, the standard will continue to be used and comparisons made. This chapter looks at the president and foreign policy from various perspectives to provide a better foundation for evaluation. 166It examines the president’s constitutional powers, then turns to the president as a person and the presidency as an institution. It begins by noting the ongoing debate over whether presidents are strong or weak leaders.

Weak President or Strong President

Some see the president as a weak leader, little more than a clerk lacking the power to command others to act who must rely on the ability to persuade.1 Far from running the government, the president struggles simply to make sense of events.2 Information does not come to presidents automatically, nor can they count on speed and secrecy in making and carrying out decisions. In 2003, George W. Bush had a conversation with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Jerry Brenner, who headed the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Bush asked who was in charge of finding weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Rumsfeld said it was Brenner; Brenner said it was Rumsfeld.3

Others see the president as, at least potentially, a strong and powerful leader capable of unilateral action.4 By acting first and alone, they argue, the president places political competitors in the position of having to undo what they have just done. Unilateral presidential action is not a matter of usurping congressional powers as much as it is taking advantage of ambiguities in the constitutional distribution of powers, the existence of vaguely worded legislative language, and the inherent difficulties that Congress, the courts, and other political competitors face in acting in a unified fashion. The unilateral president has many tools at his disposal, ranging from issuing executive orders and national security directives to setting up new organizations and redefining their responsibilities.

The President and the Foreign Affairs Constitution

Chapter 6 introduced the Constitutional distribution of powers within which the president operates in making foreign policy. The Constitution binds both the president and Congress, but over time presidents have developed a number of strategies for circumventing its restrictions. This section examines four of the most important strategies at the president’s disposal: using executive agreements, issuing signing statements, employing unofficial ambassadors, and engaging in undeclared wars. This does not mean that presidents will always get their way or that their actions will go unchallenged. When Congress did not act on immigration reform, Obama issued an executive order providing deportation relief to illegal immigrants in the United States. A federal court judge ruled the order unconstitutional, and the administration was forced to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. On a tied vote, the Supreme Court held that Obama’s immigration reform policy was illegal.

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Executive Agreements

From the outset, presidents have claimed the constitutional authority to engage in international agreements by means other than treaties. Over time, this alternative, known as an executive agreement, became the favored presidential method for entering into understandings with other states. Unlike a treaty, an executive agreement does not require the consent of the Senate before coming into force. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that it carries the same legal force as a treaty. The principal limit on its use is political, not legal: the fear that an angry Congress would retaliate by blocking other presidential foreign policy initiatives.

The proportion of executive agreements to treaties has increased steadily over time. Between 1789 and 1839, the United States entered into 60 treaties and 27 executive agreements. A century later, between 1889 and 1939, those numbers had grown to 524 treaties and 917 executive agreements. Because Obama preferred to act through executive orders and memorandums, he did not make as much use of executive agreements as his predecessors. Midway through his last year in office, Obama had entered into 183 executive agreements, compared to 291 for George W. Bush. However, many were for high-profile foreign policy issues, such as a 2012 strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan (establishing the outlines for U.S.–Afghanistan relations after U.S. combat forces left in 2014), the 2015 climate agreement, and the nuclear agreement with Iran.

Consistent with its America First perspective, the Trump administration has not embraced executive agreements to the extent of its predecessors, preferring instead to leave previously established agreements, such as the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement and the Paris Climate agreement. The major exception is Trump’s pursuit of the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement. A numerical comparison shows that the U.S. entered into 76 executive agreements or treaties in 2018, and only 23 as of June 2019. This compares to an average of just over 100 in previous years.5

The Senate has attempted to curb the president’s use of executive agreements on a number of occasions. Two efforts have been particularly noteworthy. The first, the Bricker Amendment, would have required that executive agreements receive the same two-thirds vote of approval from the Senate as treaties. In 1954, the Bricker Amendment failed by one vote to get the two-thirds Senate majority needed to set into motion the amendment ratification process at the state level.

The second was the 1972 Case-Zablocki Act, which required that Congress be informed of all executive agreements so that it could take action to block them if it saw fit.6 This Act was seen as necessary because executive agreements have not always been made public. Particularly revealing in this regard is the history of secret presidential agreements with Saudi Arabia.7 Both Harry Truman and John Kennedy entered into agreements to use military force to protect the Arab nation under certain conditions. However, the Case-Zablocki Act has not ended the practice of secret executive 168agreements. In part, the problem is definitional. In 1975, Representative Les Aspin estimated that four hundred to six hundred agreements had not yet been reported to Congress because the White House claimed that they were understandings, oral promises, or statements of political intent, not executive agreements.8 Included among these were a 1973 secret message that President Nixon had sent to North Vietnam promising reconstruction aid in return for a peace agreement, Henry Kissinger’s 1975 understanding with Israel and Egypt that U.S. personnel would be stationed in the Sinai as part of the disengagement process, and the 1975 Helsinki Accords.

Signing Statements

Presidents may also act unilaterally by issuing signing statements. Some amount to little more than claiming credit for a piece of legislation or thanking key supporters. Others are statements of Constitutional rights and prerogatives. Such was the case in 2005, following the passage of anti-torture legislation. Two weeks after its public signing, Bush quietly attached a signing statement dealing with the rights of detainees. It stated that he would interpret the legislation “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and . . . in achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President in . . . protecting the American people from further terrorist attacks.”9 In effect, this statement claimed presidential authority to conduct the War on Terror as the executive saw fit.

Both Obama and Trump actively used signing statements. For example, in June 2009 Obama signed a spending bill that placed conditions on money given to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In his signing statement, Obama stated that he would not allow this legislation to interfere with his presidential authority to conduct foreign policy and negotiate with other countries. In signing the $716 billion defense bill in August 2018, Trump raised objections to fifty provisions of the bill, including one that called for formal consultations with South Korea and Japan before reducing the size of the U.S. military footprint in South Korea. Trump did not say he would refuse to abide by these provisions, but indicated that he would implement them “consistent with his authority as commander in chief.”

Executive Orders, Spending, and Administrative Powers

Presidents also have a number of more subtle options to pursue their foreign policy agendas.10 One is to issue executive orders, directives issued to U.S. government agencies. These differ from executive agreements, which the president enters into with other countries. Obama issued executive orders in a variety of foreign policy areas. In 2016, he signed an executive order ending a twenty-year-old economic sanctions program against Iran 169for its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The order revoked four previous executive orders and modified a fifth one. Eight executive orders imposing sanctions on Iran remained in place. During his second term, Obama issued controversial executive orders involving cybersecurity. One provided for expanded information sharing and collaboration between the government and private sector and development of a voluntary framework for cybersecurity standards and best practices. Another allowed his administration to impose sanctions on groups or individuals engaged in cyberattacks or commercial espionage in cyberspace.

Trump has used foreign policy executive orders for a variety of issues including drone strikes, trade violations and abuses, and imposition of economic sanctions on Venezuela and Iran. As noted in the Dateline section at the beginning of this chapter, Trump’s most controversial executive order was his travel ban. Drafted largely within the White House and during the transition, it did not follow the vetting system traditionally used in formulating executive orders. Typically, the White House staff sends a proposed executive order to Congress for comment. It is then sent for review to the Office of Management and Budget, which in turn sends it to relevant departments for comment. The president is also required to obtain guidance from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. In the case of the travel ban, input was restricted to Trump’s appointees and did not involve professional staffers. NSC officials raised concerns and presented lengthy comments. Secretary of Defense Mattis was not given an opportunity to comment on the proposal and did not see the final version until the day it was announced.

Presidents may also use their spending and administrative powers to advance foreign policy initiatives blocked by Congress:

· In 1999, the Senate rejected the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Yet Bill Clinton helped fund a global network of monitoring stations that were vital to detecting illegal tests.

· The United States has not yet signed the 1997 treaty banning land mines, yet it has avoided producing, transferring, or deploying new ones. It is also the world’s leading funder of de-mining projects and helps fund follow-up meetings on the treaty’s progress.

· The United States has not signed the treaty establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC), yet Bush supported a UN resolution referring Darfur to the ICC. Obama sent U.S. forces to Africa to help capture ICC fugitive Joseph Kony and turned over a Congolese warlord to the ICC after he surrendered to a U.S. embassy.

· Trump sought to use funds from other agencies or projects to fund his border wall when Congress did not provide him with the funding he desired. For example, it was announced in September 2019 that $3.6 billion would be redirected from Department of Defense military construction projects to fund the wall.

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Informal Ambassadors

Presidents have also reduced the Senate’s confirmation powers from what was originally intended by using personal representatives as negotiators. President Franklin Roosevelt relied heavily on Harry Hopkins in making international agreements, leaving Secretary of State Cordell Hull to administer “diplomatic trivia.” President Jimmy Carter had Hamilton Jordan conduct secret negotiations during the Iranian hostage crisis. The Reagan administration relied on National Security Council (NSC) staffers and private citizens to carry out the Iran-Contra initiative. Obama turned to informal ambassadors for dealing with a number of high-profile foreign policy problems, most notably reopening relations with Cuba; negotiations were conducted by two White House officials and begun without the knowledge of Secretary of State John Kerry.

A similar problem confronts the Senate if it wishes to influence the type of advice the president receives. Presidents are free to listen to whomever they please. Under Woodrow Wilson, Wilson’s friend and confidant Colonel House was more influential than Secretaries of State William Jennings Bryan and William Lansing. Today, it is widely recognized that the National Security Advisor often has more influence on presidential thinking than the Secretary of State. Yet the former’s appointment is not subject to Senate approval.

Two informal ambassadors have risen to prominence in the Trump administration. One is Rudolf Giuliani, Trump’s personal lawyer who also headed a lucrative international consulting firm. Giuliani emerged as a central figure in foreign policy to Ukraine, for which Trump was impeached. Giuliani made contact with key Ukrainian individuals and parsed for the removal of key State Department officials. Also influential is Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, who holds the title of Senior Advisor. Kushner was put in charge of formulating the administration’s Middle East Peace Plan. Kushner’s lack of foreign policy experience led foreign governments to see him as easily manipulated. A case in point is Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who was linked to the killing of Jamal Khashoggi, became Kushner’s primary source of information and analysis of events in the region. A related concern was that Kushner lacked the necessary security clearance level to gain access to the most sensitive information. Chief of Staff John Kelly had Kushner’s clearance level downgraded at one point. It was raised back to full Top Secret level in May 2018 over the objection of staffers. Ivanka Trump received a full Top Secret level clearance at the same time.

Undeclared Wars

By one count, the United States has used force over three hundred times.11 However, it has declared war only five times. The passage of the 1973 War Powers Resolution (see the Historical Lesson in chapter 6) did little to redress this imbalance. Rather than willingly abide by it, many presidents 171have submitted reports to Congress declaring that they were doing so voluntarily and characterized their decisions to use force as lying beyond the jurisdiction of the War Powers Resolution. Carter did not engage in advance consultations with Congress in carrying out the Iranian hostage rescue effort, claiming that it was a humanitarian action. Reagan used the same logic in bypassing Congress on the invasion of Grenada. He would later argue that, because U.S. Marines were invited in by the Lebanese government, they were not being sent into a combat situation, so the War Powers Resolution did not apply. This assertion lost much of its support when 241 U.S. soldiers were killed in a terrorist attack. Even though George H. W. Bush did obtain congressional resolution supporting the 1991 Persian Gulf War, he continued to stress that “I don’t think I need it . . . I feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations resolution.” In a twist on this situation that occurred well before the War Powers Resolution, President Grover Cleveland went so far as to tell Congress that even if it declared war against Spain over Cuba, he would not honor that vote and begin a war.

Obama’s thinking on presidential war powers evolved during his presidency. As a presidential candidate, Obama stated, “the president does not have the power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.” As president, his position was consistent with that of his predecessors. Obama sought congressional approval neither for military action against Gaddafi nor for the continuance of military operations there after the mandated sixty-day reporting period established by the War Powers Resolution. Approval, he held, was not necessary because it was a humanitarian operation. Later, he asserted that the sixty-day reporting requirement did not apply because U.S. military activities in Libya fell short of “hostilities.”12

In the case of the Yemen resolution discussed in the Dateline section of chapter 6, Trump has similarly rejected congressional efforts to control his use of military power. In contemplating the use of military force against Iran in response to its downing of a U.S. drone, Trump talked with congressional leaders but did not seek official congressional support or inform them that an attack had been authorized and was under way (only to be recalled).

When Does the President Matter?

In a study of twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy, John Stoessinger was struck by how few individuals made crucial decisions shaping its direction.13 He found that movers (exceptional individuals who, for better or worse, not only find turning points in history but help create them) have been far outnumbered by players (individuals caught up in the flow of events, who respond in a standard and predictable fashion). One explanation for this imbalance is 172that relatively few situations may exist in which the personal characteristics of the president or other policy makers are important for explaining policy.

A useful distinction can be made between action indispensability and actor indispensability.14 Action indispensability refers to situations in which a specific action is critical to the success or failure of a policy. The identity of the actor is not necessarily a critical factor in explaining the action. It is possible that any individual (player) in that situation would have acted in a similar manner. Actor indispensability refers to those situations in which the personal characteristics of the involved individual are critical to explaining the action taken. In Stoessinger’s terms, the individual involved is a mover, increasing the odds of success or failure by bringing unique qualities to bear on a problem.

A crucial element of action indispensability is the degree to which the situation permits restructuring. Some situations are so intractable or unstable that it is unreasonable to expect the actions of an individual policy maker to have much of an impact. In concrete terms, the identity of the president will have the greatest impact on policy under four conditions, all of which were met by the events of 9/11:

1. The issue is new on the agenda. Although the administration of Bill Clinton had given terrorism more attention than the incoming George W. Bush administration, no firm plan of action was in place.

2. The issue is addressed early in the administration. The terrorist attacks occurred early in the Bush administration.

3. The president is deeply involved in ongoing issues. Bush was deeply involved in decision-making following the attacks.

4. The issue is in a state of precarious equilibrium, and events are primed to move in any number of directions. Certainly, from the viewpoint of key individuals in the administration, the terrorist attacks presented the United States with a unique opportunity to remake the political map of the Persian Gulf.


Chapter 8

Bureaucracy

Dateline: Fixing the State Department

Viewed in terms of lines on an organizational chart, the foreign affairs bureaucracy provides presidents with a powerful set of tools to use in promoting their foreign policy agendas. Examined more closely, these organizations cannot be used freely. They have their own histories, operating styles, and concerns. The inherent tension within these conflicting perceptions often leads to policy disputes, feelings of frustration, and laying blame. It can also lead to calls for organizational reform and creation of new organizations.

From the very beginning of the Trump presidency, reorganizing the State Department was a primary focus of his efforts to reshape the foreign affairs bureaucracy. This was not surprising. Two prominent themes of Trump’s campaign were “Make American Great Again,” and put 190“America First.” Trump asserted that too many existing international agreements were bad deals, in which other countries took advantage of the U.S. The Trump administration saw reorganization as long overdue. Foreign service officers saw it as an effort to cripple or dismantle the State Department.

The Trump administration’s structural reform agenda presented two different types of challenges to the State Department. One involved its relationship with other foreign policy bureaucracies. The most notable proposal was the possible merger of the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Under the existing framework, USAID operates as an independent agency under the guidance and supervision of the Secretary of State. The purpose of this reorganization was to begin the process of concentrating U.S. foreign aid programs spread across many military and civilian agencies under a single umbrella. Some within the State Department feared that this would result in a smaller and more politicized foreign aid budget.

The second structural challenge involved internal day-to-day operations. Here, public attention centered on the Trump administration’s proposal to cut the State Department budget by as much as 33 percent. Producing a strong negative response both inside and outside the State Department, this proposal was widely considered to be “dead on arrival” in Congress. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis went so far as to state, “if you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.”

Less visible was incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s reorganization of decision-making. He quickly expanded the size of the policy planning staff attached to his office. Traditionally, it housed twenty to twenty-five people who provided strategic advice to the Secretary of State. Rumors were that Tillerson sought to double or triple its size. One consequence of this expansion was to isolate Tillerson from input by State Department professionals creating blockages in State Department decision-making. Some characterized his new advisors as a praetorian guard. One example of Tillerson’s isolation was the September 2017 meeting of the Community of Democracies, which was expected to be attended by leaders from more than a hundred countries. For months, Tillerson was silent regarding his approval for the meeting. Formal invitations to embassies were delivered only eight days before its scheduled start. As a result, only a small number of foreign ministers attended.

Structural reforms and personnel reforms go hand in hand. Along with calls for deep budget cuts came proposals for a potential nine percent cut in personnel, as many as 2,300 positions in the State Department. Downsizing the State Department began immediately and at all levels. Days into the new administration, even before Tillerson was confirmed by the Senate, the entire senior management team at the State Department 191either resigned unexpectedly or were terminated in a cloud of controversy. A hiring freeze ordered by Tillerson reduced the number of new Foreign Service Officers from 366 in 2016 to 100 in 2018. By November 2017, the number of minister counsellors (the equivalent of two-star officers) had declined by 15 percent, career ministers (three-star officers) by 42 percent, and career ambassadors (four-star officers) by 60 percent, as another wave of resignations swept through the State Department. There was no Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern affairs or ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt or Qatar to help formulate policy toward Syria.

Personnel changes brought about by Tillerson also resulted in a rise in tension within the State Department. An Assistant Secretary of State accused several career staffers as being disloyal and retaliated against those who had served under Obama. Another high ranking Tillerson appoint was forced out of their job because of how she treated the career and political staff.

The Trump administration’s reform agenda included a changes in the State Department’s mission. Some took the form of decisions made by Tillerson, such as removing Afghanistan, Burma, and Iraq from the list of countries ineligible for some forms of military aid because they were identified as using child soldiers; this decision produced an internal protest memo within the State Department. Others included removal of references to reproductive rights for women and of the term “occupied territories” (i.e. Israel’s presence in Gaza and the West Bank) from the State Department’s annual human rights report. Under Mike Pompeo who succeeded Tillerson as Secretary of State a new advisory commission on Human Rights was established that to reevaluate how human rights are thought about in U.S. diplomacy. Most fundamentally, there occurred a change in the State Department’s official mission statement. On May 1, 2019, it read:

The U.S. Department of State leads America’s foreign policy through diplomacy, advocacy, and assistance by advancing the interests of the American people, their safety and economic prosperity.

In the State Department’s Fiscal Year 2015 Report and on its website the following statement appeared:

The [State] Department’s mission is to shape and sustain a peaceful, prosperous, just and democratic world, and foster conditions for stability and progress for the benefit of the American people and people everywhere.

This chapter examines the organizational structure and internal value systems of the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the intelligence community, and takes a brief look at key domestic bureaucracies that have developed a foreign policy role. The chapter concludes with an examination of how policy makers respond to the challenges of dealing with the foreign affairs bureaucracy.

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Presidents and the Bureaucracy

According to Henry Kissinger, “The purpose of bureaucracy is to devise a standard operating procedure that can cope effectively with most problems.”1 Doing so frees high-level policy makers to concentrate on the unexpected and the exceptional, and to pursue policy innovations. While true in theory, this view is misplaced. In practice, two problems arise:

1. Policy makers expect far more from bureaucracy than help in dealing with the normal—probably too much more. Consider President Gerald Ford’s statement about the U.S. involvement in Vietnam: “We could have avoided the whole darn Vietnam War if somebody in the Department of Defense or State had said, ‘Look here. Do we want to inherit the French mess?’ ”2 As you saw in chapter 4, the reality of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was far more complex.

2. Policy makers often feel trapped by the bureaucracy. Obama put it this way: “There’s a playbook in Washington that presidents are supposed to follow. It’s a playbook that comes out of the foreign policy establishment. . . . But the play book can also be a trap that can lead to bad decisions.”3

One important player in the bureaucratic foreign policy playbook is the U.S. State Department.

The State Department

Then called the Department of Foreign Affairs, the State Department was created in 1789 as the first department under the new Constitution. According to historical tradition and government documents, the president looks first to the State Department in making foreign policy.

Structure and Growth of the State Department

The State Department serves as a transmission belt for information between the United States and foreign governments, and as a source of expertise and skills on which senior policy makers can draw. These are daunting tasks. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State under Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, estimated that he saw only six of every one thousand cables sent to the State Department each day, and that the president saw only one or two.4 By the end of the twentieth century, the State Department was electronically processing over fourteen thousand official records and ninety thousand data messages each day, and over twenty million e-mail messages per year. The full magnitude of this explosion of electronic messaging came into focus when the congressional investigation into the terrorist attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi inquired into Hillary Clinton’s use of a personal computer to engage in official business. It found that some two 193thousand messages contained pieces of redacted information considered confidential. Of these, three-quarters dealt with “foreign government information,” a catch-all category including information obtained through meetings and conversations with foreign officials.

Annually, the State Department represents the United States in over fifty major international organizations and at over eight hundred international conferences. In 2019, the United States had diplomatic relations with 191 countries, and had 170 embassies, along with consulates and liaison and branch offices. Together, these overseas posts represented thirty different government agencies. Present in a typical embassy are representatives from the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Departments of Defense, Agriculture, Commerce, and the Treasury, the CIA, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Export-Import Bank.

The concept of a country team was developed to bring coherence to the welter of agencies and programs now represented at an embassy. The ambassador heads the country team. In practice, ambassadors have found it quite difficult to exercise enough authority to transform a set of independent and often competing policies into a coordinated and coherent program. For example, in 2005, the Pentagon requested that it be allowed to put special operations forces into a country without the explicit approval of the ambassador. Also complicating the problem is the ambassador’s background. Frequently, the ambassador is not a career diplomat. A study of ambassadorial appointments from 1960 to 2014 found that in twenty-nine countries and diplomatic missions such as the United Nations, 81–100 percent of ambassadors were political appointees.

The State Department’s basic structure remained largely unchanged for the duration of the Cold War. Beneath the Secretary of State were two Deputy Secretaries of State and six undersecretaries with responsibility for such matters as political, economic, and management affairs, and international security. The remainder of the State Department was organized around geographical areas and functional tasks. While the number and identity of the regional areas held steady, the functional bureaus showed considerable change over time. Certain units—such as the education and culture bureau—disappeared, and others—such as the refugee bureau and a bureau responsible for human rights and humanitarian affairs—were created. Today a very different picture exists. There are over sixty bureaus and offices covering geographic (Africa, Near Eastern Affairs), policy (Global AIDS, Arms Control, Verification and Compliance), and administrative (Budget and Planning, Human Resources) issues. There are also over one dozen Special Envoys (hostage affairs, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, North Korean human rights issues); over one dozen Special representatives (the Arctic, international labor affairs); and six ambassadors at large (religious freedom, criminal justice).

Running parallel to this significant organizational growth is a “shrinking presence” overseas. In June 2008 there were 6,636 foreign service officers (FSOs). This was just 10 percent more than twenty-five years earlier. In an 194attempt to rectify this problem, a hiring initiative called Diplomacy 3.0 was begun; its goal was to increase the size of the Foreign Service by 25 percent by 2013. This goal was not met; the number of FSOs only increased to 8,000 by 2013 and dipped to just below that level in 2019.

The State Department’s Value System

Capturing the essence of the State Department’s value system is best done by looking at how Secretaries of State have defined their roles and how the FSO corps approach their jobs.

 The Secretary of State The job of Secretary of State is not an easy one. All too frequently, post–World War II Secretaries of State have left under a cloud of criticism. Among the charges leveled are lack of leadership (Dean Rusk), aloofness and arrogance (Dean Acheson), and overly zealous attempts to dominate foreign policy making (Henry Kissinger). Secretaries of State have also found themselves excluded from key decisions. Cyrus Vance resigned from the Carter administration partly in protest over his exclusion from decision-making on the Iranian hostage rescue effort.

In order to participate effectively in foreign policy making, Secretaries of State, like their counterparts at the Department of Defense and the CIA, need a power base from which to work. In practice, this has required them to either become advocates of the State Department perspective or serve as loyal allies of the president.5 Neither guarantees success, and each power base has its dangers and limitations. Adopting the first perspective makes them suspect in the White House, while the second makes them suspect within the State Department and runs the risk of letting the department drift for lack of effective oversight. Under President George W. Bush, Colin Powell’s primary role orientation was as a spokesperson for the State Department perspective. Condoleezza Rice built her power base around the close personal ties she had developed with Bush during the campaign and as National Security Advisor.

The greatest danger comes with the failure to establish any power base, a situation most recently experienced by Trump’s first Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson. As noted in the Dateline section at the beginning of this chapter, Tillerson failed to establish support within the State Department. Referred to as “the phantom of Foggy Bottom,” his reform agenda was viewed as little more than an exercise in cost cutting and reorganization. It was seen not as an effort to improve the ability of the State Department to carry out its mission, but as an act of obedience to Trump. The problem for Tillerson was that he never gained the trust of Trump, either. Trump was attracted to Tillerson by his experience as Chief Executive Office of ExxonMobil and his reputation as a global deal maker. Once in office, Trump came to see Tillerson as weak, and the two were seldom on the same page. Tillerson supported the Iran nuclear agreement, but Trump opposed it and gave Tillerson no advance notice 195of his decision to terminate it. When Tillerson talked of negotiating with North Korea, Trump tweeted that “he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man.” After fourteen months, Trump used Twitter to fire Tillerson.

Mike Pompeo, who was an enthusiastic defender of Trump’s foreign policy as head of the CIA, replaced Tillerson. Pompeo took office announcing his intention to get the State Department’s “swagger” back. However, as information about his supportive role in Trump’s Ukraine policy and its undercutting of the State Department emerged, Pompeo’s standing dropped significantly.

 

Foreign Service Officers At the heart of the State Department system is its FSO corps. The Foreign Service was created in 1924 by the Rogers Act. Foreign service officers were intended to be generalists, “trained to perform almost any task at any post in the world.”6 The principal organizational device for producing such individuals is to rotate them frequently among functional tasks and geographic areas. The State Department relied on civil service, which existed apart from the FSO corps, to perform its “lesser” technical and administrative tasks. Increasingly, FSOs feel themselves under siege by the blurring of the line between civil service and Foreign Service personnel, and by increasing politicization within the State Department. Senior positions are routinely filled with short-term political appointees, a process referred to as political creep.

The distinction between FSOs and civil servants in the Foreign Service has long been the subject of controversy. In 1954, a reorganization proposal developed by Harry Wriston led to the merger of these two personnel systems. “Wristonization” was not a complete success. The hope had been this merger would “Americanize” the Foreign Service by bringing in individuals with backgrounds different from those of the typical eastern, Ivy League, and upper-class officers. This broadening of outlook was seen as necessary; many viewed FSOs with suspicion for becoming aloof and separate from American society. They were a prime target of the McCarthy investigations into un-American activities. In 1953 alone, some 70–80 percent of the highest-ranking FSOs were dismissed, resigned, or were reassigned to politically safe positions.7

The representativeness of the FSO corps continues to be a major problem. In 1976, a class action discrimination lawsuit was brought against the State Department. That year, only 9 percent of FSOs were women. In late 1993, the FSO corps was 56 percent white male, 24 percent white female, 7 percent minority male, and 4 percent minority female. In 2019, 6.3 percent of FSOs were Hispanic, 5.4 percent were African American, and 4.8 percent were Asian; 41.2 percent were female. Additional problems surround the nature of key overseas appointments. For example, under George W. Bush, there were only three Hispanic FSOs serving as ambassadors, all in Latin America. Only one of the thirty-two diplomats heading embassies or U.S. missions in Europe in 2009 was black.8

Impact of the State Department on Foreign Policy

Once the centerpiece of the foreign affairs bureaucracy, the State Department has seen its power and influence steadily erode. It has gone from being the leading force behind such policies as the Marshall Plan, NATO, and containment, to largely playing the role of the critic who finds fault with the proposals of others. It has become defensive and protective in interdepartmental dealings, unable to centralize and coordinate the activities of the foreign affairs bureaucracy.9

Two complaints frequently are voiced about the State Department’s performance. The first centers on the FSO corps value system, which consists of a clearly identifiable world outlook and set of guidelines for survival within the State Department bureaucracy.10 The FSO is empirical, intuitive, and cautious.11 Risk taking in the preparation of analysis or processing of information is avoided. The FSO mission is to keep intact the policy inherited from predecessors.12

Second, State Department recommendations are insensitive to the presidential perspective on foreign policy matters. Because it fails to frame proposals in ways that will produce political support for, or at least minimize political costs to, the president, State Department recommendations are easily dismissed. In the eyes of many, it has become more of a spokesperson for foreign viewpoints within the U.S. government than an advocate of U.S. national interests. This situation is not universally condemned. Some feel that it is an appropriate role for the State Department to play, and that it should stop trying to perform functions for which it is no longer suited.13

Efforts are underway to change the FSO system and the culture of the State Department. One change is in how FSOs are selected. A new selection process has been put in place for selecting applicants for the Foreign Service; it changes the focus from doing well on a lengthy national exam to emphasizing team-building abilities and résumés.

The Department of Defense

For most of its history, the military security of the United States was provided by forces under the command of the War Department and the Department of the Navy. No political or military authority, other than the president, existed to coordinate and direct the affairs of these two departments. During World War II, the ineffectiveness of this system became apparent, leading U.S. policy makers to take a series of ad hoc steps to bring greater coherence to the U.S. war effort. In 1947, the National Security Act formalized many of these arrangements by establishing a Department of the Air Force, giving legal standing to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and creating a National Military Establishment and the position of Secretary of Defense. Further changes were made in 1949, when the National Military Establishment was redesignated the Department of Defense.14

Structure and Growth of the Department of Defense

A number of different organizational reform issues have arisen since the Department of Defensewas created. In the early 1980s, the pressing issue was improving the operational efficiency of the armed forces. The failed 1979 hostage rescue effort, the 1983 terrorist attack on the marines in Beirut, and problems encountered during the 1983 invasion of Grenada were cited by military reformers as proof that reforms were needed, beginning at the very top.15 Congress shared these concerns. Over the objections of the executive branch and many in the military, Congress passed two pieces of legislation in 1986 designed to remedy the perceived shortcomings. The Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened the position of the JCS relative to that of the individual services. It also gave added weight to those areas of the Pentagon with an interservice perspective. The second piece of legislation, the Cohen-Nunn Act, established a unified command for special operations and created an Assistant Secretary of Defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict.

A recurring organizational challenge is budget size. Advocates of increased defense spending routinely identify four great waves of post WW II defense budget neglect.16 Each followed the end of a major U.S. military commitment, but also reflected the onset of additional economic and social problems facing the military. The first (1945–1950) followed the end of WW II; the second (1970–1980) followed the end of the Vietnam War; the third (1991–2000) followed the end of the Cold War; and the most recent period began in 2009 with the decisions to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan.

President Trump has aggressively moved to end this fourth period in seeking a $54 billion increase over Obama’s proposed 2017 defense budget. He requested a $716 billion defense budget for 2019 and a $750 billion budget for 2020. Even though Trump got most of what he asked for in 2018 ($700 billion), budget problems remain. One issue is, where is the money coming from? As you saw in the Dateline section at the beginning of this chapter, reallocating money from the State Department to Defense was politically unacceptable to many in Congress; so, too, is simply spending more money. Another issue is whether authorizing the military to spend $700 billion is enough. According to a 2011 law setting limits on federal spending, Defense Department spending for 2018 must be capped at $549 billion.

A second, complex set of recurring challenges involves personnel issues. The military is facing a numbers crunch. In 2018, the Army missed its recruiting goal for the first time since 2005. With a goal of 76,000 (reduced from the initial target of 80,000), the Army signed up fewer than 70,000 recruits, despite offering waivers for previous marijuana use, bad conduct records, and health problems. Compounding matters, the Army is much smaller than it was at the end of the Cold War. At that timeit 198had 732,403 active-duty soldiers; a 2014 Pentagon study projected a 420,000-person army in 2019.

One part of the solution has been to outsource many tasks to private contractors. These tasks range from cleaning military facilities to supervising supply lines, operating combat systems, and training troops. At one point there were more than sixty private firms with twenty thousand employees in Iraq. While typically seen as a means of saving money and dealing with personnel shortfalls, outsourcing can also be used for political purposes, such as when use of U.S. forces would arouse negative public opinion or run against congressional limits on the size of U.S. military operations. An example of the latter occurred in Colombia during its civil war. Another part of the solution to the personnel shortage problem has been to rely more heavily on National Guard and reserve forces. By 2005, almost 400,000 of the nearly 870,000 members of the reserves had been activated since 9/11. This represents the greatest proportional use of the National Guard and reserves since World War II. Part of the solution to the personnel problem may be to rethink the all-volunteer army. In 1973, military conscription in the United States ended for a variety of reasons; the leading arguments made for ending the draft included demographics, cost, moral arguments about imposing military service, and opposition to Vietnam.

Related to the numbers crunch problem is how representative the military is of American society and how individuals are treated by the military. More and more, the military has come to rely on young men and women from economically depressed rural areas. There has also been a decline in the number of African American recruits. The Historical Lesson reviews the path toward integrating African Americans into the military. Today, much of the focus is on its treatment of women, LGBTQ+, and immigrants. At issue here are both the roles they are allowed to play and the respect they are shown.

Historical Lesson

Integrating the Military

On July 26, 1948, President Harry Truman signed Executive Order 9981:

WHEREAS it is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve in our country’s defense:

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the armed services, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale. . ..

Executive Order 9981 went on to create a President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services one of whose tasks was to examine how rules, procedures, and practices might be altered or improved upon to carry out this policy.

The history of black American participation in the military shows a continued pattern of white reluctance to allow it along with the military necessity that it occur. From the very outset, free and slave blacks fought on both sides in the American Revolution. New England states offered freedom to slaves who fought, as a means of meeting their quota of troops in the Continental Army. Some southern states did likewise, but to a lesser degree. For its part, the British also offered freedom to blacks who joined with them.

During the Civil War, manpower shortages led Congress to pass legislation to allow blacks to fight but required them to serve in racially segregated military units; 180,000 blacks fought for the North. It is estimated that one-fifth of the Northern Army was black. After the war, many of those promised freedom remained in slavery. After the war, four black regiments were established, which fought in the Indian wars and the Spanish-American War.

This policy of segregated military units was still in effect when World War II began. An additional policy was a quota system, which limited the number of blacks in the military to their percentage of the total American population. Once again, pressures of wartime led to de facto changes in policy. With an insufficient number of Allied forces available to counter the German offensive at the Battle of the Bulge, black soldiers were allowed to volunteer to fight alongside white soldiers rather than serve in support roles but were placed in separate platoons.

After the end of World War II, political pressures mounted for ending segregation. A 1945 Army report called ending discrimination a desirable goal but concluded that it was impractical. In 1947, the Army permitted states to determine the level of integration of their National Guard above the company level. New Jersey ended military segregation at that point. As a result, some states had partially integrated reserve units, but the active military was still segregated.

Also in 1947, A. Philip Randolph helped establish the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service and Training as part of a broader civil rights movement effort to end discrimination in the military. The focal point of their concern was Truman’s plan for universal military service; while it did not endorse discrimination, it was perceived by Committee founders to endorse segregation. It was against this backdrop that Truman issued his executive order. It came shortly after he was nominated to run for president, an election many expected him to lose, especially since southern democrats, unhappy with the party’s endorsement of civil rights, decided to run their own candidate for president under the banner of the Dixiecrats.

Truman’s executive order encountered resistance and was not uniformly accepted. In 1949, the secretary of the army was forced into retirement for refusing to desegregate the army. That same year, 32 percent of white army personnel opposed integration in any form. During the Korean War, a shortage of white enlisted men and increasing black enrollment created yet another crisis. Ninety-eight percent of blacks still served in segregated units, and black soldiers were trained at a segregated military base. In 1951, while General MacArthur was still the commanding officer in Korea, evidence surfaced that far more black soldiers than white soldiers were being court martialed. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) sent Thurgood Marshall to investigate. He defined the military situation there as one of “rigid segregation.” As a result of his investigations, charges against most black soldiers were dropped. In September 1954, under the Eisenhower administration, the last all-black military unit was abolished. Many consider the endpoint of segregation in the military to be July 26, 1963, when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara ordered an end to discrimination against blacks outside of military bases.

Applying the Lessons

1. Did Executive Order 9981 go far enough to address discrimination and segregation in the military? Explain your answer.?

2. To what extent should the military be representative of all groups in society?

3. How do you measure the extent to which real change takes place in the military, the Foreign Service, intelligence agencies, or other national security bureaucracies?

On December 3, 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced that the Defense Department would open all combat jobs to women. “There will be no exceptions.” When the announcement was made, the Navy and Air Force had already opened most of their combat positions to women, and the Army was moving in that direction. In September of that year, the Marine Corps, which was 93 percent male, had asked for an exemption for its infantry and armor positions. With this announcement, their request was denied. An estimated 220,000 military jobs were now available to women.

While the history of women serving in combat positions in the military goes back to the American Revolution, it was not until the passage of the Army Reorganization Act in 1901 that women could formally join the military (through the Army Nurse Corps). The 1948 Women’s Armed Forces Integration Act gave women a permanent place in the U.S. military, but limited the number of women to 2 percent of the enlisted force and 20110 percent of the officer corps. Since the 1970s, the military has repeatedly turned to the question of the role of women in combat. An early 1990s Presidential Committee on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces called for determining military assignments on the basis of qualifications, not gender. The War on Terrorism and the military conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, both of which lacked clearly defined combat zones, brought this issue into sharp focus. Women soldiers searched homes and people for weapons, engaged in door-to-door neighborhood patrols, and were embedded in special operations forces. By the end of 2015, at least 161 women had died and 1,016 had been injured in these conflicts.

The role of women goes beyond their ability to engage in combat. It extends to the problem of harassment, which potentially affects all active-duty service members. In 2015, the Pentagon reported 6,131 cases of sexual assault, more than double the number in 2007. In 2018, that number jumped to 7,623. According to estimates, about 20,500 service members (13,000 women and 7,500 men) were sexually assaulted in FY2018, up from 14,000 in 2016.

Controversy over the ability of gays to serve in the military long centered on the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy put in place in 1994, which allowed gays to serve, but did not stop them from being discharged. In December 2010, after months of political maneuvering by opponents in Congress along with a Pentagon study supported the policy, President Obama signed legislation repealing “don’t ask, don’t tell.”

The major point of controversy in the Trump administration has been the ability of transgender individuals to serve in the military. A June 2016 directive banned the military from involuntarily separating transgender individuals in the military and allowed them to begin receiving medical treatment. In June 2017, just before the new policy was to take effect, Mattis delayed its implementation. One month later, Trump announced on Twitter that transgender individuals would not be allowed to serve in the military, calling their presence disruptive and overly expensive. Trump indicated that he had consulted military leaders on the decision, but Mattis had received only one day’s notice. A 2016 RAND study had concluded that the costs were not that high, and that only two thousand to eleven thousand active-duty personnel were transgender. In March 2018, Trump issued a revised order, which took a step back from the previous total ban on transgender troops and deferred implementation to the Pentagon. To many observers, it echoed the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. A series of lawsuits have accompanied the Trump administration’s efforts to implement a transgender ban. On January 22, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed President Trump’s transgender military ban to go into effect while it was still being contested in lower courts.

Trump’s policies have also highlighted the place of immigrants in the military. The primary avenue for immigrants to enter the military has been the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) program. 202Since 2009, more than 10,400 individuals with language, medical, and other skills, considered vital to U.S. security and in short supply, entered the military through the program with the promise of citizenship. Some five thousand immigrants were recruited in 2016. That same year the Pentagon, citing espionage dangers, put new security measures in place, which added considerable time to the process of gaining citizenship, placed MAVNI under review, and closed it to new recruits indefinitely. The waiting time was so long that a thousand recruits lost their legal immigrant status, risking deportation. In July 2018, it was revealed that the Pentagon was discharging immigrants who had entered the military through the MAVNI program. In August 2018, the Army announced that it was reviewing the matter and suspended the discharge program.

The Value System of the Department of Defense

Understanding the internal value system of the Department of Defense requires examination of how Secretaries of Defense and the professional military have defined their jobs.

 Secretary of Defense Secretaries of Defense generally have adopted one of two roles.17 The first is that of the generalist. Generalists recognize and defer to military expertise. They are concerned with coordinating and integrating the judgments they receive from military professionals and see themselves as representatives of the Department of Defense in the policy process. In contrast, the functionalist is concerned with consolidating management and policy control in the office. Functionalists reject the notion a unique area of military expertise exists and see themselves as first among equals in defense policy decision-making. Above all, the functionalist seeks to manage the system efficiently in accordance with presidential policy objectives.

James Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense, adopted the generalist perspective. As Secretary of the Navy, he had opposed creating a unified military establishment, and his tenure as Secretary of Defense was marked by repeated efforts by the services to protect their standing as independent organizations. Since Forrestal, the most prominent Secretaries of Defense have adopted a functionalist perspective. Robert McNamara, who served as Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War, was a functionalist who sought to move decision-making power out of the hands of the military services and into those of civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. To do so, he brought Planning, Programming, and Budgetary System (PPBS) analysis to the Department of Defense. Instead of organizing the budget by department (Army, Navy, Air Force), the PPBS examined spending by its principal missions, such as conventional defense of Europe or nuclear deterrence.18

Donald Rumsfeld, George W. Bush’s first Secretary of Defense, sought to alter the fundamental direction of American military policy and 203organization. Military professionals saw his presence as a “hostile takeover.”19 Victory against the Taliban in Afghanistan and early military success in Iraq appeared to vindicate his positions. However, subsequent problems with the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq led to open questioning of his ideas and management style.

Retired Marine Corps General Jim Mattis, Trump’s first Secretary of Defense, was also a functionalist. He took office with a clearly defined set of views regarding the structure and operation of the military; his goal was to create a better equipped, more deadly, and more effective fighting force less dependent on alliances, but he did favor working with allies. As stated in his military defense strategy, the focus of the U.S. military was on countering Russia and China, not counterterrorism and corralling rogue nations. Trump delegated Mattis significant leeway on issues such as implementing the ban on transgender troops and sending more troops to Afghanistan, but Mattis often disagreed with Trump’s policies In his letter of resignation, he stated his opposition to the announced removal of troops from Syria and Afghanistan, the downgrading of NATO, and the threat that Russia posed to U.S. security.

Professional Military To understand the system of values inside the Defense Department, it is necessary to examine the outlook of the professional military toward policy making at two different levels. At the highest level is the general pattern of civil–military relations. Two different general sets of perspectives have long shaped thinking about this relationship.20 The traditional view sees professional soldiers as above partisan politics. They are expected to restrict themselves to speaking out only on those subjects that fall within their sphere of expertise. In turn, policy makers stay out of military matters. In the fusionist perspective, the professional soldier must acquire and use political skills in order to exercise an effective voice on military matters.

Neither approach is without its problems. The line separating military decisions from political ones is anything but clear, making it difficult—if not impossible—for the professional to stand above politics. The challenges to a president created by an embrace of the fusionist perspective were on full view in both the Trump and Obama administrations. The commanding general in Afghanistan called for increasing the U.S. presence in opposition to Obama’s view, publicly challenging Obama’s Afghanistan policy. Trump repeatedly had policy disagreements with Mattis, who resigned in protest over his Syria policy. Trump later angered many military professionals with his intervention into the case of a Navy SEAL accused of war crimes in Iraq.

One level down from civil-military relations, there are differences in outlook among the military services, each of which has a different “personality.”21 It is said that the Navy worships at the altar of tradition, the Air Force at the altar of technology, and the Army at the altar of 204country and duty. The services also have different views of their own identities. The Navy sees itself, above all, as an institution with a stature and independence that must be protected. The Air Force sees itself as the embodiment of the idea that air power is the key guarantor of national security in the modern age. The Army views itself as artisans of warfare. A challenge facing the U.S. Army today is how to conceptualize modern warfare. The success of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 gave impetus to the idea of a Revolution in Military Affairs, in which technological advances are central to success on the battlefield. At the same time, the development of counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare thinking (see chapter 4) emphasizes the soldiers and their interaction with the local population.22

Impact of the Defense Department on Foreign Policy

The professional military’s impact on foreign policy is a subject that is often discussed with great emotion, as evidenced by concerns expressed about Trump’s appointment of Mattis, Mike Flynn, and H. R. McMaster as National Security Advisors, and John Kelly as Chief of Staff. All were retired generals who Trump often referred to collectively as “My Generals.” The fear was that the generals would set a confrontational tone to Trump’s foreign policy and use military force rather than diplomacy as the foreign policy instrument of choice. Reality proved to be more complex. Trump’s initial foreign policy did take a hawkish turn, but it was only after the exit of the generals and their replacement by civilians that U.S. foreign policy took on a more aggressive and high-risk profile, with the Venezuelan crisis and the possibility of U.S. military action in the Persian Gulf.

Overall, historical evidence suggests that military professionals are not necessarily more aggressive than their civilian counterparts.23 Where the military professional and the civilian policy maker part company is over how and when to use force, not whether to use it. The military prefers to use force quickly, massively, and decisively, and is skeptical of making bluffs that involve the threatened use of force. Diplomats, on the other hand, prefer to avoid using force as long as possible, because they see its use as an indication of a failure in policy; they are positively predisposed to making military threats.

The military’s real policy influence comes through its ability to set the context of a decision through the presentation of information, capabilities, and tactics. Bob Woodward, author of The Commanders, similarly reflects on the variability of military influence on decisions regarding the use of force.24 The Pentagon, he notes, “is not always the center of military decision making.” “When the President and his advisors are engaged, they run the show.”

205

The CIA and the Intelligence Community

The intelligence community comprises sixteen agencies plus the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is the head of the intelligence community. Until this position was created in 2004, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) served as head of both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the intelligence community. Members of the intelligence community are charged with working independently and collaboratively to gather the information necessary to conduct foreign relations and national security activities.

Structure and Growth of the CIA and the Intelligence Community

Two points mustbe stressed before turning attention to three of the most prominent members of the intelligence community: the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the ODNI. First, the intelligence community is not a static entity. Its composition, and the relative importance of its members, has changed over time as new technologies have been developed, the international setting has changed, and bureaucratic wars have been won and lost. The status of charter membership is best conferred on the CIA; the State Department’s intelligence unit, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); and the intelligence units of the armed forces. All of these were given institutional representation on the National Security Council at the time of its creation in 1947. Three institutions that have a long-standing but lesser presence in the intelligence community are the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Treasury Department, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which is now part of the Energy Department. The newest addition to the intelligence community is the Department of Homeland Security.

Second, the concept of a community suggests the existence of a group of actors who share common goals and possess a common outlook on events. In these terms, U.S. intelligence is a community in only the loosest sense. More accurately, it is a federation of units with varying degrees of institutional autonomy that both work together and challenge one another.

This point can be illustrated through several examples. The CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) have often been in conflict over matters of intelligence analysis. The DIA was created in 1961 for the purpose of unifying the overall intelligence efforts of the Department of Defense. During the Vietnam War, the CIA and DIA were often at odds overestimates of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troop strength; CIA estimates were far more pessimistic than those of the DIA. During the Iraq War, the challenge to the CIA came from a newly created Office of Special Plans (OSP) within the DIA; its mission was to provide independent review of raw intelligence and dispute the mainstream interpretations by the intelligence community.

Selective examination of members of the intelligence community begins by looking at the CIA. For most Americans, the CIA is the public face of the intelligence community. In addition, since its director was also the head of the intelligence community until the DNI came into existence, it long enjoyed the status of first among equals within the intelligence community.

The organizational predecessor of the CIA was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which was created by a 1942 military order and tasked with collecting and analyzing strategic information and conducting special operations. At the end of World War II, Truman disbanded the OSS and assigned its intelligence duties to units within the State Department, the Army, and the Navy. The 1947 National Security Act reestablished the CIA as a stand-alone intelligence unit.25

The CIA began a major reorganization in 2015. According to CIA director John Brennan, the goal is to break down organizational “stove pipes” that artificially separate CIA personnel into different operating units, making communication between them difficult. Central to the new organizational structure are ten mission centers that will bring together analysts and covert action operators on a day-to-day basis. The mission centers are modeled on the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center and will focus on such issues as terrorism, weapons proliferation, global issues, and the Middle East. Until the reorganization, analysts were housed in the Directorate of Intelligence and operators were in the Directorate of Operations. These units were two of the four major operational arms of the CIA. The Directorate of Intelligence has been the primary producer of government intelligence documents, which range in frequency from daily briefs to weekly, quarterly, and yearly summaries, and occasional special reports. The best known of these reports are the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). The Directorate of Operations, more recently identified as the National Clandestine Service, has had three basic missions: the secret collection of information, counterintelligence, and covert action. Those missions will continue to exist, but the National Clandestine Service will now focus on recruiting and training personnel to be assigned to the centers. The two other arms (the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Personnel) continue to operate.

These four directorates will be joined by a new directorate: the Directorate of Digital Innovation. It is tasked with such responsibilities as cyber espionage, protecting the CIA’s internal e-mail system, and monitoring global social media and other open source information sources. No timetable has been set for completing the reorganization.

The second prominent member of the intelligence community, the NSA, was the first major addition to the intelligence community. It came into existence in 1952 and operates as a semiautonomous agency of the Department of Defense.26 In 2013, the NSA became the center of unwanted public attention when the media began reporting on the existence of a 207secret domestic surveillance program (discussed in the Dateline section in chapter 5). Controversy over the NSA’s intelligence collection practices resurfaced more recently. In 2017, there was a major leak of its highly classified hacking tools by a group calling itself the Shadow Brokers. In 2019, it was revealed that Chinese intelligence agents already possessed these NSA hacking tools, and had redirected them for cyberattacks on U.S. allies and private companies operating abroad.

The NSA has also undergone major internal organizational changes. In 2009, the U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was created and placed inside the NSA under a “dual hat arrangement,” in which the head of the cyber command was also the head of NSA. Its focus was to be on developing policy and legal frameworks for the defense of the military’s computer systems, along with protecting private sector computers that provide a potential entryway into government computer systems. In 2013, following a Department of Defense study concluding that the military was unprepared for a full-scale cyberattack, the Pentagon began a major expansion of its cybersecurity force capabilities. Three different missions now have been identified for the expanded Cyber Command: (1) national mission forces to protect computer systems and other infrastructures from foreign attack, (2) combat mission forces to plan and execute offensive operations, and (3) cyber protection forces to strengthen the computer networks of the Department of Defense. In 2017, USCYBERCOM was elevated to the status of a full and independent unified combatant command; it is scheduled to be split from the NSA and become an independent agency. Most recently, in 2019 the NSA announced that it would create a Cybersecurity Directorate to pursue a more aggressive cyber policy and more closely align its offensive and defensive cyber operations.

The third organization is the newest agency involved in intelligence; the ODNI came into existence as part of the post-9/11 reforms of the intelligence community. Its head, the DNI, is identified as the principal intelligence advisor to the president and is charged with overseeing and directing the implementation of the National Intelligence Program. The two principal organizational subunits within the ODNI focus on collection and analysis.

Two broad areas of concern have been raised about the operation of the ODNI. The first is its size. As originally envisioned, the ODNI was to be a lean management organization sitting atop the intelligence community. It quickly grew into an organization with a staff of over 1,500 people. In 2010, the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board concluded that the ODNI had become “bureaucratic and resource heavy” to the point that its ability to coordinate the intelligence community was impeded. A second concern is the powers of the office, particularly its budgetary powers and ability to shape intelligence programs. Only the CIA exists as a separate organizational entity within the intelligence community. All other organizations are parts of larger departments, most often the Department of 208Defense. Consequently, the other members of the intelligence community look with only one eye to what the DNI demands, while keeping the other eye firmly fixed on departmental positions and priorities. Shortly after its creation, the FBI moved 96 percent of its intelligence budget into units that were not under the jurisdiction of the DNI. More recently, the DNI reached an agreement in principle with the Department of Defense that the civilian portion of the Pentagon’s intelligence budget will come under its control. The Pentagon’s covert action/spy budget will remain under Pentagon jurisdiction.

The Intelligence Community’s Value System

Periodically throughout its history, the CIA has found itself an institution under siege, both because of covert action and intelligence failures. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan was so outraged over the CIA’s failure to anticipate the fall of communism in the Soviet Union that he called for its abolition.27 One area that has received a great deal of attention is the manner in which both its top leadership and professionals approach their jobs. The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report placed a major portion of the blame for the intelligence failures on Iraq and preceding 9/11 on “a broken corporate culture and poor management.” Let’s turn our attention to the informal organizational side of the CIA.

 

Director of Central Intelligence Because the DCI was simultaneously head of the intelligence community and head of the CIA, the office has had many role orientations available from which to choose. Few sought—and none achieved—real managerial control over the intelligence community. The most recent to try was Stansfield Turner, President Carter’s DCI, who ran into stiff and successful resistance from Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.

When defining the role of head of the CIA, three outlooks have been dominant: managerial, covert action, and intelligence-estimating. Only John McCone (1961–1965) gave primacy to the intelligence-estimating role, and he was largely an outsider to the intelligence process before his appointment. Allen Dulles (1953–1965) and Richard Helms (1966–1973) both stressed the covert action aspect of the agency’s mission. Since the replacement of Helms by James Schlesinger, DCIs have tended to adopt a managerial orientation. Although their particular operating styles have varied, a common theme has been to increase White House control over the CIA. Mike Pompeo, Trump’s first head of the CIA, very much fit this mold. He has been characterized as the most openly political head of the CIA in a generation. Not only was he a strong public supporter of Trump’s foreign policy agenda, but he actively participated in White House policy discussions. Pompeo received a mixed reception at the CIA, where he was valued for his support of intelligence gathering operations but faced misgivings over his contradictory public statements; on occasion 209they supported the intelligence community’s analyses, but other times they echoed Trump’s criticism of intelligence. Pompeo’s successor, Gina Haspel, a career professional described by some in the intelligence community as “the consummate insider,” also adopted a managerial orientation on taking the position. During her confirmation hearings, she called for returning the CIA to its traditional mission of focusing on foreign states and less on counterterrorism. Haspel’s nomination was politically controversial because of her involvement in the CIA’s post-9/11 torture programs; she had run the Thailand prison where waterboarding took place. It was welcomed from those within the agency, who saw it as placing intelligence professionals back in charge of the CIA.

According to critics of the managerial role orientation, one frequent result of this outlook is politicization of the intelligence process. In other words, the heads of the CIA have used their managerial control over intelligence products to ensure that its findings are consistent with the policy preferences of the administration rather than reflecting the judgment of intelligence professionals.

Politicizing intelligence, a charge directed at William Casey, Robert Gates, and George Tenet, was also a major concern raised from the outset of the Trump presidency. While some concern was directed at Pompeo’s deep engagement in policy making and his open support of Trump’s agenda, most (from retired DCIs Michael Hayden, John Brennan, and James Clapper) pointed to Trump’s repeated public attacks on the intelligence community’s findings concerning Russian interference in the 2016 election. Especially troubling to the intelligence community was his statement at the Helsinki summit with Vladimir Putin: “They said they think it’s Russia; I have President Putin, he just said it’s not Russia. . . . I will say this: I don’t see any reason why it would be. I have great confidence in my intelligence people, but I will tell you that President Putin was extremely strong and powerful in his denial today.”

 

Director of National Intelligence The DNI is torn by the same types of role conflicts that have afflicted DCIs: the need to establish a power base and the need to define an orientation to intelligence. There have been four DNIs in a little more than five years. John Negroponte, the first DNI, moved quickly to solidify his position as the president’s primary intelligence advisor by personally presenting the president’s daily intelligence briefing.

Later DNIs have struggled to establish an effective working relationship with both the president and the intelligence community. Dan Coats, Trump’s first DNI, joined with DCI Pompeo in resisting an attempt by Stephen Bannon and Jared Kushner to bring in a political ally to head a White House review of the intelligence community. In another step in the direction of politicizing intelligence in the new administration, at Trump’s request Pompeo rather than Coats began briefing the president on intelligence. Coats resigned in 2019 following a series of conflicts with Trump 210over intelligence assessments on North Korea and Russia and Trump’s critiques of the intelligence community. Coats was to be replaced by Representative John Ratcliffe, a staunch Trump supporter on the House Intelligence and Judiciary Committees who was considered by some Republicans and Democrats in Congress to be too political and not experienced enough for the position. Within days of his nomination, Ratcliffe withdrew his name from consideration. When it became clear that she would not be nominated to be the next DNI, Susan Gordon, a career professional who Coats had recommended as his successor, resigned from government service.

 

Intelligence Professionals Views on intelligence within the intelligence community are far from uniform. Differences exist both between and within organizations.28 For example, some suggest that, within the cyber command, four different outlooks can be identified, all of which should be present: cyber priests (who think in terms of deterrence), cyber prophets (adaptation), cyber designers (resilience), and cyber detectives (resistance).29

With these outlooks in mind, it is possible to identify four tendencies in the approach to intelligence by members of the intelligence community.30 One tendency is to be a current-events-oriented “butcher,” cutting up the latest information and presenting the choicest pieces to the consumer. A second tendency is for analysts to adopt a “jigsaw theory” of intelligence. Here the analyst acts like a “baker”; everything and anything is sought after, classified, and stored, on the assumption that at some point in time, it may be the missing ingredient to solving a riddle. Similar to the butcher’s role, the baker’s orientation is consistent with the policy maker’s notion of intelligence as a free good and the assumption that the ambiguity of data can be overcome by collecting more of it.

A third tendency is the production of “intelligence to please” or “backstopping.” This occurs when consumers desire only the intelligence that supports their policy preferences, ignoring efforts at providing anything but supportive evidence. The final role orientation is the “intelligence maker,” who acts as an organizational broker, forging a consensus on the issue at hand. The danger here is that the consensus reached may not be based on an accurate reading of events. Facts bargained into existence provide an equally suitable basis for consensus, but can lead to policy failures.

Impact of the CIA and the Intelligence Community on Foreign Policy

The challenges the intelligence community has faced in interacting with Trump are not unprecedented. Intelligence is not easily integrated into the policy process.31 The relationship between intelligence and policy makers is marked by a series of tensions that often serve to make the impact of 211intelligence on policy less than what it could be under optimum circumstances. As Paul Pillar, who once served as deputy director of the CIA’s counterterrorism center, observed about the Iraq War: “Had Bush read the intelligence community’s report, he would have seen his administration’s case for the invasion stood on its head.”32

A starting point to understanding the challenges that intelligence faces in influencing policy is the view held by many policy makers that facts are self-interpreting. Intelligence is about connecting the dots, not providing meaning to the data. 33 The limitations on the influence of intelligence produced by this perspective are reinforced by the tension between the logic of intelligence and the logic of policy making.34 The logic of intelligence is to reduce policy options by clarifying issues, assumptions, and consequences. The logic of policy making is to keep options open for as long as possible and build policy support. As such, policy makers are most eager to get information that will help them convince Congress or the public about the merits of a policy. 35 Finally, intelligence produced by the intelligence community is not the only source of information available to policy makers. Interest groups, lobbyists, the media, and personal acquaintances all compete with intelligence, and presidents are free to listen to whichever intelligence they choose.

The Domestic Bureaucracies

The most recent additions to the foreign affairs bureaucracy are organizations that, traditionally, have been classified as domestic in their concerns and areas of operation. Their foreign policy involvement parallels a development after World War II, when the Defense Department, rather than the State Department, was instrumental in shaping global arms development programs and international security arrangements.36

Integrating these newcomers into the foreign affairs bureaucracy has not been an easy task. At the core of the problem is finding an agreed-on balance between foreign policy and domestic concerns. In the early post–World War II period, the foreign policy goal of containing communism dominated over private economic goals; more recently, domestic goals have become dominant and are often pursued at the cost of achieving broad foreign policy objectives.

Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture

Of all of the domestic bureaucracies, the Department of the Treasury (also called the Treasury Department) plays the most prominent role in foreign policy. By the mid-1970s, its influence had made the State Department become more of a participant than a leader in the field of international economic policy. It now takes a strong Secretary of State to neutralize the influence of the Treasury Department and its domestic allies.37

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The two departments approach international economic policy from quite different perspectives. Like the other domestic bureaucracies, the Treasury Department takes an “America first” perspective (a term used long before being embraced by Trump), placing the needs of its clients at the center of its concerns. One author describes it as having an “undifferentiating adversary attitude” toward world affairs.38 In contrast, the State Department’s tendency is to adopt a long-range perspective on international economic problems that is sensitive to the positions of other states. A type of standoff for influence in the policy process currently exists between the State Department and Treasury Department,; however, Treasury has been ascending in importance due to the rise in the use of economic sanctions, the recent global economic downturn, and the central role played by China in holding U.S. debt and maintaining an undervalued currency. Treasury gained additional importance as a foreign policy actor when, along with trade restrictions, economic sanctions began to include financial sanctions directed at individuals.

The Department of Commerce (also called the Commerce Department) has also emerged as a major foreign affairs bureaucracy. However, it is more involved in administrative or operating issues than policy ones. Until 1969, the Commerce Department’s primary foreign policy involvement stemmed from its responsibility for overseeing U.S. export control policy. These controls were aimed largely at restricting the direct or indirect sale of strategic goods to communist states. Since 1980, the Commerce Department has become the primary implementer of nonagricultural trade policy and the chief administrator of U.S. export and import programs. The Commerce Department is not without its own challengers for influence on trade policy. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has also benefited at the expense of the State Department, and its activities enjoy a great deal of congressional support.

The Department of Agricultural (also called the Agriculture Department) remains a junior partner in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. Active in administering U.S. food export programs, Its best-known foreign policy role is as administrator of P.L. 480, the Food for Peace program, which provides free export of government-owned agricultural commodities for humanitarian and developmental purposes. In 2003, the Agriculture Department became embroiled in controversy for providing export help to American tobacco companies. Its Foreign Agriculture Service provided market information to firms about where the demand for American cigarettes was high, and where control laws were weak.

Numerous others play occasional roles as well. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has eighty-six foreign offices in sixty-seven countries, where it carries out bilateral investigations; sponsors and conducts counternarcotics training; participates in intelligence gathering activities; and provides assistance in developing drug control laws and regulations. The DEA gained notoriety recently, when its agents accompanied Honduran counternarcotics 213police in two firefights with cocaine smugglers. One of these incidents left four people dead, leading to demands that the agency leave the country.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has become more active in foreign policy issues through its inspection program of drug and food imports into the United States. Some 150 countries export FDA-regulated products to the United States. As of 2008, the FDA operated foreign offices in China and India, as well as countries in Europe and Latin America. Movement in the opposite direction (decreases in influence) have also taken place. In 2017, the Trump administration closed the Department of Energy’s Office of International Climate and Technology, which was established in 2010 to provide technical advice to countries trying to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is an uneasy fit in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. It has elements of both foreign and domestic policy, given the wide range of activities that fall under its jurisdiction. The DHS was established on November 25, 2002, as a response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Its creation combined twenty-two different agencies from eight different departments with a total of 170,000 employees, and had a projected budget of $37.45 million. It absorbed all of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Customs Service, and was charged with overseeing the new Transportation Security Administration. The FBI and the CIA were not directly affected by the creation of the DHS, but the new department was given an “intelligence and threat analysis” unit that would serve as a customer of FBI and CIA intelligence for assessing threats, taking preventive action, and issuing public warnings. In 2017, the DHS had an estimated two thousand individuals stationed in over seventy countries, who engaged in activities ranging from flying surveillance aircraft to questioning travelers at airports.

The DHS has encountered problems in virtually all aspects of its work, beginning with the ineffective color-coded terrorist warning system put into place after 9/11 and the tracking of activities of peaceful war protestors. As recently as 2015, it faced the possibility that Congress would deny it operating funds. In December 2017, the DHS announced the creation of a new office to deal with weapons of mass destruction. Between 2015 and 2017, it was at the center of the political controversy over Trump’s travel ban on people from seven Muslim countries. John Kelly, then head of the DHS, took responsibility for failing to hold up the policy announcement until Congress had been briefed. A DHS study contradicted Trump’s assertion of the existence of a terrorist threat requiring the ban. Later, Kelly’s successor Kirstjen Nielsen was roundly blamed in cabinet meetings for DHS failure to secure the southern border from illegal immigration effectively.

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Policy Makers’ Response to Bureaucracy

Policy makers have adopted three different strategies for dealing with bureaucracies that are perceived to be failing them.39 The first is to replace senior leaders. The second is to reorganize bureaucracies. Rare is the bureaucracy that is simply eliminated. Instead, the solution is to combine the offender with another or rearrange its internal structure. In the extreme, this solution takes the form of creating a new bureaucracy to address an ongoing problem. Finally, policy makers may simply choose to ignore the bureaucracy, either by becoming their own experts or by establishing an informal in-house body of experts to produce policy guidance.

This last strategy is not without its shortcomings that can affect the content and quality of foreign policy. British Ambassador to the United States Kim Darroch resigned in 2019 after a leaked correspondence characterized the Trump administration as “clumsy and inept.” Two years earlier, revelations in the Mueller Report showed that Russian officials were frustrated in dealing with the incoming Trump administration because it could not find out who was in charge of matters.

It also needs to be noted that bureaucrats have their own view of the problem of integrating the bureaucracy with policy makers. When asked by President Kennedy what was wrong with the State Department, career diplomat Charles Bohlen replied, “You are.”40 Indications are that this sentiment still exists. In January 2017, some nine hundred State Department employees signed a dissent cable criticizing Trump’s travel ban citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries. The year before fifty-one State Department employees signed a letter to President Obama in which they asserted his policy toward Syria would not end the civil war and called for the ousting Syrian president Assad.

Over the Horizon: U.S. Space Command

This chapter began by recounting efforts by the Trump administration to restructure the State Department, an existing foreign affairs bureaucracy. It ends by looking over the horizon to the challenge of thinking how best to organize the military after next,41 one geared to addressing future defense needs: Trump’s plan to create a U.S. Space Command.

Trump first advocated the establishment of a separate military space force in March 2018. In June of that year he signed an executive order directing the Pentagon to construct a space force as the sixth branch of the military. (The other five are the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.) This was followed in December by a memorandum authorizing the Department of Defense to create a new space command.

A U.S. Space Command had existed from 1985 to 2002, and had been given the task of coordinating the Army, Naval, and Air Force space forces. The command was disbanded after the 9/11 terrorist attack so that homeland security efforts could be better funded. Its operations were taken 215over by the U.S. Strategic Command and the Air Force. The first political steps in the direction of creating a true space command came in 1999, when Congress established a Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization. Advocates argued that this was necessary because treaties had negotiated away the U.S. space advantage. The commission’s report warned against the dangers of a “Space Pearl Harbor,” and called for creating a military department for space operations. In 2017, a bipartisan proposal was introduced in Congress to create a separate space service within the Air Force, along the lines of the Marine Corps’ status in the Department of the Navy. Doing so would allow the space force to develop its own organizational and professional culture, and speed up the acquisition of space technology. The proposal was defeated, but language was added to the 2018 defense bill requiring the Defense Department to conduct a study of how to organize military space forces.

Trump’s endorsement and authorization of a space command provided few details on what was to be created, and left many obstacles in place. The most significant obstacle is that only Congress can create a new military service. While Congress contains supporters of the concept of an independent Space Command, it also has powerful opponents who serve on the House Armed Services Committee. Not to be ignored is the political competition over which state receives the economic benefits that would accompany its creation. Alabama, California, and Colorado were the early finalists in the competition.

Many senior military officials who had publicly opposed the idea of a separate military branch before Trump’s announcement, especially those in the Air Force, argue that creating a separate space force would only complicate national security decision-making, weaken the military capabilities of existing services, and create internal conflict within existing branches of the military, as many of their uniformed and civilian personnel would have to join the new service. According to one estimate, the new space command would pull some six hundred people from other military space operations in the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and then add at least another one thousand staff members.

Another complicating factor is the nature of space warfare. James Moltz argues that Cold–War era thinking about the nature of space warfare and space power is obsolete42 and needs to be reshaped, with greater attention to the idea of networked power and the collaboration of military and commercial/entrepreneurial space power resources. Doing so may require creating a Space Command quite different from the one being proposed.

In February 2019, Trump issued Space Policy Directive (SPD) 4, centralizing all military space functions under a new Space Force Command led by a civilian Undersecretary of the Air Force and a four-star general. This announcement marked a step back from creating a sixth military service, but found added support in Congress. In December 2019, Congress approved limited funding for the Space Command.

Critical Thinking Questions

1. Is the formal structure of a bureaucracy or the value system of its members more important to the quality of bureaucratic performance? Explain your answer.

2. Is there a place for the domestic bureaucracies identified as making American foreign policy or should their tasks be taken over by more traditional foreign policy agencies? Explain your answer.

3. Can the State Department lead in the making of U.S. foreign policy? Should it lead? If not, who should lead?

Key Terms

· “America first” perspective, 212

· civil-military relations, 203

· country team, 193

· foreign service officers, 193

· military after next, 214

· outsource, 198

· political creep, 195

· politicizing intelligence, 209

· Revolution in Military Affairs, 204

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Further Reading

Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray, eds., Mission Creep (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014).

This book argues that a militarization of U.S. foreign policy has taken place as a result of the Defense Department’s involvement in the implementation and formation of foreign policy programs in nontraditional areas such as foreign aid, public diplomacy, economic development, and covert action.

American Diplomacy at Risk (Washington, DC: American Academy of Diplomacy, April 2015).

This study of American diplomacy is critical of the politicization of American diplomacy, which it argues has contributed greatly to the disappearance of foreign service professionals. It concludes with recommendations to improve the State Department’s organization and management.

Roger George and James Bruce, Analyzing Intelligence, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014).

The authors provide an excellent overview of the analytic challenges facing the intelligence community and the dynamics of intelligence analyst—policy maker relations.

John Harr, The Professional Diplomat (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969).

This book provides an early but still valuable and frequently cited study of the attitudes and values of professional diplomats.

Benjamin Jensen, Forging the Sword (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016)

This book, which traces the process of doctrinal reform within the U.S. Army, finds that “incubators” and advocacy networks are central to bringing about change 217in military organizations. Together, they can bring about changes in elite thinking that otherwise would not occur.

Thomas Mackubin, “Military Officers: Political without Partisanship,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 9 (Fall 2015), 88–101.

According to tradition, military officers are to remain apolitical in carrying out their duties. This essay examines this tradition and several ways in which military officers exercise influence in public debates over military policy.

Amy Zegart and Michael Morrell, Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: Why U.S. Intelligence Agencies Must Adapt or Fail,” Foreign Affairs 98 (May 2019), 85–96.

Commenting on the intelligence community’s failure to identify the magnitude of Russia’s interference in the 2016 election, the authors argue that the major challenges it faces include open source information and artificial intelligence.

The Presidency, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy

Course

Institution Affiliation

Date

The Presidency, Bureaucracy and Foreign Policy

Introduction

The National Security Council is one of the most critical decisions a president-elect must make (NSC). It is imperative that the organization’s principal, important job be re-evaluated today. It has become more like an agency than a presidential staff as the NSC has increased in size. It’s buried in policy minutiae and mostly concerned with the here and now. Because of its lack of focus, it cannot fulfill the crucial role that it alone can accomplish organizing the policy process so that, at the same time, agencies receive a fair hearing while the president can make clear foreign policy decisions in a timely fashion. President-elect Trump has a responsibility to guarantee that this vital role is reinstated (Viveash 2020). Cut the NSC’s size, streamline its structure, and increase its seniority in order to accomplish this.

Foreign policy’s objective is to manage the country’s relationships with other countries throughout the world. Rather than being the result of a single action or decision, the policy is the outcome of a course of action or a long-term pattern of behavior. Numerous presidents, as well as cabinet secretaries, members of the House and Senate, and workers of foreign policy agencies, have all played a role in developing US policy toward Russia. In other words, policymaking is not accidental; rather, it is purpose-driven (Harrington 2017). The United States is justified in entering into an international agreement with another country on a specific issue, such as free trade or nuclear disarmament (Harrington 2017). After establishing a broad understanding of policy, we’ll turn our attention to US foreign policy.

Challenges that President faces in working with NSC in implementing foreign policy programs.

Challenge 1: NSC is a bureaucracy that cannot be easily moved and would influence executive power.

The NSC was introduced in order to offer advisory services to the executive concerning issues of security and foreign policies. The NSC has undergone various transformations that include being empowered and increased staffing is experienced. The National Security Council is composed of three components: an advisory body, a national security advisor, and a professional staff. The 1947 Act established the National Security Council to advise the president on integrating domestic, international, and military policies affecting all facets of national security (Harrington 2017). The Presidents found it difficult to deal with the NSC since it has policies and procedures that have an effect on executive power. The NSC has undergone four phases before the President Trump administration, and this is when it altered the manner in which foreign policy problems come to the president.

A scenario like the one of President Trump’s administration is an indication that the powers of the president in the executive have been affected and this is what contributes to presidents finding it challenging working with NSC. Experience has taught presidents that bureaucracies cannot be easily removed and the moment they get the power and influence it needs then the presidents in power have no option but to follow them as stated. Presidents have been forced to think outside the existing bureaucracies that are in place in coming up with other organizations that give them the power to lead. Truman believed that the president has the power to make foreign policy decisions, but it was not the case, the president’s power is influenced by the NSC. Eisenhower maintained the National Security Council’s institutionalization and inclusion in policymaking by establishing a Planning Board to provide policy recommendations to the president and an Operations Coordinating Board to oversee the implementation of national security decisions. Eisenhower also established the position of assistant for national security affairs (commonly referred to as the president’s national security advisor) to facilitate the coordination of national security policy decisions. This NSC system was never designed to function properly. Rather than generating sound policy recommendations, the lowest common denominator of the agreement was used to make decisions. Rather than broadening presidential possibilities, it actually reduced them. Policy implementation continued to be governed by departmental objectives and problem definitions, rather than by presidential objectives and perspectives.

The presidents have been seeking power and influence on the executive powers and influence of the foreign policies and decisions that are likely to be undermined by the bureaucracy brought by NSC. There was a challenge before about the decisions that the presidents made about the foreign policy and a good example is a scenario where President Obama developed a foreign policy on immigrants that the courts termed unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court upheld the decision. The president finds it difficult to rely on the NSC on important decisions like a foreign policy where a minor misadvise would ruin their legacy. The presidents have a short period of time making decisions under the 100 days in office and they cannot give the mandate to NSC to make the foreign policy decisions and advice that would take time and fails to meet the presidents’ expectations.

Challenge 2: Misunderstanding the mandates of NSC and the Defense Department

Presidents find it challenging in making the decision about who to work with within the executive because there is the Department of Defense and the NSC that have the mandate on the matter of national security and the moment the president relies on one body creates disagreements (Menshikova 2019). There are scenarios where Presidents find it successful working with the different bodies and maintaining a good relationship. Despite some critics’ assertions that Condoleezza Rice allowed the Defense Department to dominate policymaking during President Bush’s first term, the majority of people agree that she had a positive working relationship with the President and was an effective public spokesperson during that time period. Hadley made few public appearances when questioned about the NSC staff’s role in overseeing NSC decisions. Additionally, he has been credited for orchestrating a review of Iraqi policy that resulted in significant changes, as previously indicated.

It works well when the president performs well and has a positive connection with the National Security Council, but when there are misunderstandings; productivity suffers (Roele 2017). Brzezinski’s rivalry with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was not publicly apparent during the Carter Administration’s first year; however, as senior Administration officials recommended divergent responses to issues such as Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa and the Iranian hostage crisis, reports of tensions between the two men increased in the second year.

Differences between Vance and Brzezinski at the end of the administration were largely regarded to have contributed to poor and vacillating policymaking. Henry Kissinger, the National Security Adviser under President Nixon, and the Secretaries of State and Defense had previously battled. As a result of Nixon’s preference for Kissinger’s counsel, the foreign policy never stalled, and new ideas were developed. Jimmy Carter, on the other hand, was torn between Brzezinski and Vance, and the two were frequently in opposition to one another (Roele 2017). Senator Edmund Muskie succeeded Vance in April 1980, following Vance’s resignation for his opposition to the ill-fated Iranian hostage rescue operation. After Brzezinski’s public involvement in policymaking became a source of contention, calls for Senate confirmation of National Security Council advisers and tighter legislative oversight arose. There were also reports of infighting on the National Security Council personnel between Carter loyalists and those who worked for Vice President Walter Mondale, who had been assigned a key policy position.

Challenge 3: Presidents finds it difficult to take NSC advice that is against their campaign promises.

There are scenarios that the NSC decisions about foreign policies are different from what the presidents believe that they deserve to be implemented and have promised the public. The president finds that the NSEC is pressuring them to implement policies that they do not support and failing to consider advice led to negative criticism of the president’s decisions. An example is the scenario of President Trump’s decision about Russian foreign policy. Retired General Michael Flynn resigned as a security advisor, after just twenty-four days on the job as the first advisor in Trump’s administration. Gen. H. R. McMaster, who succeeded Flynn, rapidly reorganized the National Security Council by eliminating “flintstones” and chief strategist Stephen Bannon from the NSC’s cabinet-level Principles Committee (Böller and Herr 2019).

Though he did not have McMaster’s access, Bannon did retain walk-in rights to chat with the president; Trump’s original vision for the National Security Council (NSC) included a separate Homeland Security Council, which McMaster successfully reintegrated into the NSC. McMaster was well-known for his bold and uncompromising thinking (Jotzo, Depledge, and Winkler 2018). Mattis and Kelly were two of the high-ranking officials that McMaster frequently clashed with. On top of that, he frequently differed with Trump, most notably on Russia, which resulted in his dismissal after less than a year in office. Despite Trump’s repeated calls for cooperation with Russia, McMaster accused the government of failing to respond adequately to Russia’s “traditional and new forms of aggression” in public statements following his dismissal from the White House (Böller and Herr 2019). The issue is an indication that the Presidents find it challenging that their decisions at some points are challenged by strong NSC officials especially the advisors and this is a feeling that makes the NSC structured regularly. There are many presidents that came to power and restructured the NSC, and an example is Obama that combined it with Homeland security and other agencies in order to work collaboratively and avoid disagreements.

Bibliography

Böller, Florian, and Lukas D. Herr. “From Washington Without Love: Congressional Foreign Policy Making And US-Russian Relations Under President Trump”. Contemporary Politics 26, no. 1 (2019): 17-37. doi:10.1080/13569775.2019.1617655.

Harrington, Kent. “Commentary: The Biggest Challenge For The National Security Council Isn’T North Korea Or Russia. It’S Trump.”. U.S., Last modified 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-national-security-council-commentary-idUSKBN1711ZN.

Jotzo, Frank, Joanna Depledge, and Harald Winkler. “US And International Climate Policy Under President Trump”. Climate Policy 18, no. 7 (2018): 813-817. doi:10.1080/14693062.2018.1490051.

Menshikova, Anna. “Priorities Of Foreign-Economic D. Trump&Apos;S Policy: Stated Goals And Reached Results”. Russia And America In The 21St Century, 2019, 0. doi:10.18254/s207054760005323-2.

Roele, Isobel mname. “Security Council Working Methods: Working Together For Collective Security”. SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017. doi:10.2139/ssrn.3097166.

Viveash, David. “Has President Trump Killed The Middle East Peace Process?”. Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 27, no. 1 (2020): 49-61. doi:10.1080/11926422.2020.1842219.

2

NOTE: Content highlighted in green throughout should NOT be included in any student’s

paper. Such content is included herein as flags to note and bring attention to special rules.

Prepared by Christy Owen, Liberty University’s Online Writing Center, [email protected]

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY

JOHN W. RAWLINGS SCHOOL OF DIVINITY

A Sample Paper for the Purpose of Correct Formatting In

Notes-Bibliography Style for All Students Using Turabian Format

Submitted to Dr. Full M. Name

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the completion of

OBST 515

Old Testament Orientation I

by

Claudia S. Sample

August 5, 2020

ii

Contents

(not Table of Contents)

Only include in graduate/doctoral level papers; shown here for ease of access and visualization

Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1

Ibid. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3

Basic Formatting …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

Overview …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4

Title Page ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5

Page Numbering…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5

Table of Contents …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5

Thesis Statements…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 6

Capitalization ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8

Chapters versus Subheadings …………………………………………………………………………………. 8

Contemporary Art (First-level)…………………………………………………………………………………… 10

What Are the Major Styles? (Second-level) …………………………………………………………… 10

Abstract Expressionism (Third-level) …………………………………………………………. 10

Major painters and practitioners (Fourth-level) …………………………………………… 10

Pollack as the leader (Fifth-level). …………………………………………………. 10

“Voice” and Tense ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10

Organizing a Paper Using an Outline …………………………………………………………………………. 11

Quotations and Paraphrases ………………………………………………………………………………………. 11

Citations ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 12

iii

Special Applications …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17

Examples of Citing the Bible ……………………………………………………………………………….. 17

Map, Photography, Figure, or Table ……………………………………………………………………… 19

Crediting Authors of Chapters in Edited Collections ………………………………………………. 19

Numbering ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 19

Permalinks…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 20

Turabian – Videos ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 20

Turabian – Ebooks with No Page Numbers ……………………………………………………………. 20

Bibliography Entries and Tips ……………………………………………………………………………………. 21

Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 22

Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 27

1

Introduction

“Turabian” style is an abbreviated version of the more-comprehensive “Chicago” style.

Turabian is named for Kate L. Turabian, the author of A Manual for Writers of Research Papers,

Thesis, and Dissertations: Chicago Style for Students & Researchers, which is currently in its

9th printed edition.1 This sample paper will strive to provide students with all the foundational

elements of a Turabian paper using the Notes-Bibliography format for students majoring in

History, (some) Government, and Divinity programs of study. All class assignments will follow

the Notes-Bibliography format except book reviews, which use the Author-Date format (see

the Author-Date section of the OWC’s Turabian Quick Guide for resources on that format).

Many incoming students have opted not to purchase the Turabian manual; this can have

significant negative effects on those students’ ability to learn and master Turabian format.

Fortunately, Liberty University subscribes to the Chicago Manual of Style (CMOS) database in

its Online Library for those students who do not have a current Turabian manual readily

available to them. Since the Turabian manual is the official resource commonly used in

academia, the Online Writing Center (OWC) strongly encourages students to buy the current

Turabian manual (about $10 for hard copy or electronic version). This sample paper, however,

includes references to the correlating CMOS section(s), delineated by red hyperlinked text to

denote the relevant CMOS section, in an effort to ensure all Liberty University students have the

necessary resources to excel academically. It is not proper to include hyperlinks or colored

lettering in academic class papers; those are merely included here for ease-of-access purposes.

1 Kate L. Turabian, A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 9th ed. (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 2018).

2

This paper will focus primarily on the stylistic elements discussed in Chapters 16 and 17

of the Turabian manual2 —with some minor revisions.3 Students will need to incorporate proper

grammatical elements to their papers as well, but those will not be addressed in detail herein.

It is important to delineate that undergraduate students will not use headings,

subheadings, or a contents page in most of their class papers. Graduate and doctoral students

are recommended to include these elements for any paper with at least ten pages in the body,

and required to do so in all papers with twenty or more pages in the body. Those elements are

all included and illustrated throughout this sample paper for organization and ease-of-access

purposes, but students should adhere to the parameters in their specific class assignment to

determine whether or not they should include subheadings (and a contents page, when

appropriate) in that class paper and use the appropriate template provided on the OWC’s

Turabian Quick Guide page.

Many students’ papers will require an introductory section that summarizes or previews

the argument of the whole paper, though this is not universally required for all papers.4 It should

be set apart as a separate First-Level Subheading (addressed below). Leave one double-spaced

line beneath the word Introduction and the text that follows, as shown above.5 Turabian suggests

that “most introductions run about 10 percent of the whole.”6 She also suggests that conclusions

are typically shorter than introductions.

2 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 149-235.

3 For example, footnote numbers in standard Turabian are not superscripted and are followed by a period

(pages 149-50, 162, and 406 of the Turabian manual), but Liberty University programs require superscripted

numbers with no periods, as depicted throughout this paper.

4 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 400, 402.

5 Ibid., 402.

6 Ibid., 107.

3

Ibid.

The abbreviation ibid. is used in most cases to refer to “the same” source cited

immediately before on the same page7—in this case, footnotes #5 and #6 on the prior page. One

of the changes in the 9th edition of the Turabian manual was to discourage the use of the term

ibid. However, all schools and departments within Liberty University have universally decided to

continue to require and encourage its use at this time, as it is a long-used historical term that will

occur in many scholarly resources printed prior to 2018, including most seminal works. As such,

students are instructed to disregard Turabian’s 2018 position on the use of ibid. for all Liberty

University coursework.

The term ibid. itself is a Latin abbreviation (which is why it is italicized in the text of a

sentence), so do include the period. Capitalize it when it begins the footnote, since it depicts the

beginning of a sentence, but do not italicize the term in notes.8 If the page numbers for that

footnote and the one preceding it differ, use Ibid. followed by a comma and the correct page

number(s), as shown in footnotes #5 and #6 on the previous page. If the page number is the same

for both the current footnote and the one that precedes it, simply use the word Ibid. for that

second footnote, as shown in footnote #8 below.

Liberty University’s History Department allows students to carry forward the use of

ibid. onto subsequent pages as long as there are no other sources cited between them. For

all other students, however, each new page of a student’s paper restarts the requirements, so the

first footnoted citation to a source on each page would include the author’s name and a shortened

title (if previously cited), then students can resume using ibid. for subsequent consecutive

7 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 166-67.

8 Ibid.

4

citations on that page, as shown in footnotes #8 above and #12 below. Standard Turabian format

allows two forms of shortened notes,9 but Liberty University programs of study require the

author-title version that includes both the author’s name and a shortened version of the source’s

title. Footnote #11 below (and the first footnote on each new page referring to the Turabian

manual) depicts a shortened note—where the author’s name is given, along with a few words of

the title. Always include the page number, whether using a full footnote or a shortened note.

Basic Formatting

Overview

Turabian generally offers writers great flexibility in the choices they make regarding

many stylistic elements.10 However, Liberty University’s schools and departments have adopted

specific requirements as detailed herein. General formatting elements11 required include:

 One-inch margins on all four sides of the paper.

 Liberty University requires Times New Roman size 12-pt. font for all content in the

paper itself, except Times New Roman 10-pt. font for all footnote content.

 Double-spacing throughout the body of the paper, except in the footnotes, block quotes,

table titles, and figure captions. Lists in appendices should be single-spaced, too.12

 Quotations should be blocked if the citation is five or more lines.

9 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 164-66.

10 For example, Turabian does not specify a font size or style, although all programs of study at Liberty

University using Turabian require Times New Romans, 12-point font. Many other elements are also left by Turabian

up to individual writers; the OWC has incorporated its own educated judgment for those in this sample paper, but

students have freedom to stray from those, where permitted in the Turabian manual.

11 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 384-87.

12 Ibid., 385.

5

Title Page

The Turabian manual provides two different examples and details for the title page

format options.13 Liberty University has adopted the more formal one, as shown in this sample

paper and in the templates provided to students.

Page Numbering

The title page should not include any page number,14 although it is considered the first

page of any paper. The front matter (anything between the title page and the first page of the

body of the paper) should be numbered with lowercase Roman numerals centered in the footer,

beginning with ii, to correspond with the fact that it begins on page two.15 The paper’s body,

bibliography, and appendices display Arabic numerals (i.e., 1, 2, 3) placed flush-right in the

header, beginning with page 1 on the first page of the body of the paper.16 Liberty University

now offers students templates that are already formatted with pagination, margin, font, etc.

Table of Contents

Although this page/section is commonly referred to as the “table of contents,” only the

word “Contents” should appear at the top, centered, without the quotation marks.17 Students may

not need a table of contents, but one was included in this sample paper as a visual aid, and

because it is lengthy enough to include subheadings. Liberty University assignments will specify

if students are required to include subheadings and/or a contents page. Generally, subheadings

13 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 391-92.

14 Ibid., 385.

15 Ibid., 386.

16 Ibid., 386.

17 Ibid., 390, 394-395.

6

and a contents page are required for assignments with twenty pages or more of content, and both

are encouraged for assignments of ten to nineteen pages of content.

The table of contents can span more than one page when necessary, as it does in this

sample paper. Double-space between each item but single-space the individual items themselves.

Add an extra line between each of the major sections (including the front and back matter). It is

important to note that a table of contents does not list the pages that precede it; only those pages

that follow it. Be sure that the first letter of each word is capitalized (other than articles and

prepositions within the phrase).

“Leaders” —the dots between the words on the left margin and their corresponding page

numbers at the right margin in a table of contents—are acceptable. Only include the first page

each element begins on; not the full page-span.18 MS Word will automatically populate this.

Number all pages of this element with Roman numerals. If the table of contents is more

than one page, do not repeat the title. Leave two blank lines between the title and the first listed

item.19 Single-space individual items listed but add a blank line after each item. Between the lists

for the front and back matter and the chapters, or between parts or volumes (if any), leave two

blank lines. This video tutorial shows how to format subheadings and convert those into a

Contents page for larger projects.

Thesis Statements

Section A.2.1.4 of the Turabian manual discusses the placement and labeling of an

abstract or thesis statement. Specifically, it acknowledges that “most departments or universities

18 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 390.

19 Ibid.

7

have specific models … that you should follow exactly for content, word count, format,

placement, and pagination.”20 This paper does not include a separate sample thesis statement

page; some classes will require such. Do not confuse a purpose statement with a thesis statement,

however. A purpose statement states the reason why the paper is written. For all practical

purposes, the purpose statement introduces the thesis statement. An example of a purpose

statement is, “The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that when one recognizes God’s

freedom, he/she can find biblical inerrancy defensible.” An example of a thesis statement is,

“Biblical inerrancy is defensible in the context of divine freedom.” Remember, the purpose and

thesis statements determine the form and content of an outline.

The distinction between a purpose statement and a thesis statement is important. The

purpose of this sample paper is to provide a template for the correct formatting of a research

paper. The thesis is, “Students who use this paper as a sample or template are more likely to

format their papers correctly in the future.”

Line Spacing

Section A.1.3 of the Turabian manual addresses line spacing.21 As mentioned above, all

text in papers should be double-spaced except for block quotes, table titles, figure captions, and

lists in appendices. The table of contents, footnotes, and bibliography entries should be single-

spaced internally, but double-spaced between each entry.22 Turabian specifies in Section A.2.2.4

to “put more space before a subheading than after.”23 Liberty University recommends adding an

20 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 389.

21 Ibid., 385.

22 Ibid., 385.

23 Ibid., 404.

8

extra single-spaced line before each subheading, so the total space between the end of one

section and the next subheading should be the equivalent of three single-spaced lines (or one-

and-a-half double-spaced lines); this is demonstrated throughout this sample paper and pre-

programmed into the Turabian templates. For those students who wish to learn how to format

this element themselves, see the tutorial on formatting subheadings. There should only be one

space after periods and other punctuation at the end of each sentence, before beginning a new

sentence.24

Capitalization

Turabian style has two forms of capitalization for titles: headline-style and sentence-style.

In headline style, all major words in a title (usually those with four or more letters, excepting

prepositions) begin with capital letters.25 In sentence-style, only the first word of a title, the first

word of a subtitle, and proper nouns begin with capital letters.26 Liberty University courses use

headline style for subheadings.

Chapters versus Subheadings

Turabian allows each writer to determine whether to use subheadings or chapters to

divide his or her paper into sections.27 There are separate rules for both. Chapters are usually

reserved for thesis projects and dissertations; subheadings are often used for class papers of

24 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 385.

25 Ibid., 325-26.

26 Ibid., 326.

27 Ibid., 402, 404.

9

graduate and doctoral students. Class assignments will specify whether subheadings are

permitted or required.

Turabian allows great flexibility and individuality in how one formats the various

subheading levels, when used. Liberty University has adopted the format for heading levels

shown herein, for the sake of consistency and uniformity.

The title of a heading should never be “orphaned” at the bottom of a page, without its

supporting text.28 If there is not enough room on the previous page for both the heading title and

at least the first line of the paragraph, begin a new page. Authors can, however, have two

headings in a row29 as shown on page 17 below. The formats used and recommended in this

sample paper reflect that:

1. First-level headings should be centered, bolded, and use headline-style capitalization.

2. Second-level subheadings should be centered, not bolded, and use headline-style

capitalization.

3. Third-level subheadings should be left-justified, bolded, and use headline-style

capitalization.

4. Fourth-level subheadings—though rare in Turabian style—should be left-justified, not

bolded, with only the first letter of the first word capitalized.

5. Fifth-level subheadings are extremely rare; they should be indented ½” from the left

margin, not bolded, italicized, in sentence case (including a period), followed by one

space, with the text following on the same line.

28 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 405.

29 Ibid., 404.

10

Except for fifth-levels, all text would begin on the line beneath the heading. Note that

there must be at least two of any subheading used under a larger heading.30 Turabian also does

not allow orphaned headings, where the heading appears at the bottom of the page, isolated from

its content on the next page.31 First- and second-level subheading levels are used throughout this

sample paper, but below is a visualization of each of five levels.

Contemporary Art (First-level)

What Are the Major Styles? (Second-level)

Abstract Expressionism (Third-level)

Major painters and practitioners (Fourth-level)

Pollack as the leader (Fifth-level). This one is unique in that the text begins on the same

line.

“Voice” and Tense

As a general rule, use active voice and avoid first person (I, me, we, us, our) or second

person (you, your) pronouns in academic writing unless permitted by the assignment

instructions. This paper uses third person (one, this author). In historical writing, use simple past

tense verbs, but when referring to an author’s written work, use present tense.

30 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 404.

31 Ibid., 405.

11

Organizing a Paper Using an Outline

When writing a paper, students should organize their outline first so that they are able to

plan how they will make their argument and then give their reasoning and evidence to support

their thesis statement. The first paragraph of each section should explain how this will fit into the

author’s reasoning, and then each section will end with a summary of how the evidence has

shown such reasoning to be correct. Also, transitions are very helpful at the end of each major

section so that the reader anticipates how the next section is connected to the logical progression

of the reasoning the author uses to support his or her thesis.

Liberty University undergraduate papers will generally be less than ten or twelve pages

and most will not use subheading levels or a contents page at all (unless specified in the

instructions); most Liberty University graduate and doctoral research papers will be no longer

than twenty pages and generally will not have long and detailed outlines or subheadings beyond

the third level.32 Details that would be appropriate for the fourth or fifth heading level tend to

distract the reader’s attention from the overall thesis within a short essay (typically fewer than 20

pages). Even if a fourth level is unavoidable, a fifth level is discouraged.

Quotations and Paraphrases

All content gleaned from another source will be presented as either a quote or a

paraphrase. A paraphrase means that the original wording has been change sufficiently into the

student’s own words while keeping the same meaning (not simply just rearranging the order of

the words or replacing only a few of them); a direct quote means that the words are used

verbatim, which requires quotation marks. Both require a citation with a page number to the

32 Papers with ten to nineteen pages in the body are recommended to include subheadings and a contents

page; those with twenty pages or more are required to do so; the instructions will specify what is required.

12

original source. Quotes with four or fewer lines of text in the student’s paper will be incorporated

into the text of the paragraph, as has been demonstrated herein (such as the bottom of the first

paragraph on page ten).

Quotes that span five lines or more, however, must be block quoted. Blocked quotations

are single-spaced with one blank line before and after each excerpt, and the entire left margin of

the block quote is indented one half-inch. No quotation marks are used when using a blocked

quotation, but do use them if it contains an internal quote. Turabian requires blocked quotes to be

introduced in the writer’s own words.33 For example, Jackson evokes the supremacy of home:

Housing is an outward expression of the inner human nature; no society can be fully

understood apart from the residences of its members. A nineteenth-century melody

declares, “There’s no place like home,” and even though she had Emerald City at her

feet, Dorothy could think of no place she would rather be than at home in Kansas. Our

home are our havens from the world.34

Citations

All content that is taken from another source must include a citation, whether direct-

quoted or paraphrased. Though Turabian allows two forms of citing sources in the body of a

paper, this sample paper focuses exclusively on the notes-bibliography style. Chapters 16 and 17

of the Turabian manual focus on these elements (Chapter 14 in the CMOS). The “N” denotes

(foot)notes, and the “B” denotes bibliography entries. Be sure to use the correct format for each

since there are some variances between them for each resource. Notably, the first/only author’s

name is inverted (i.e., last name first) in bibliography entries, but not in notes.35

33 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 361.

34 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford

Press, 1985), 3.

35 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 154.

13

When formatting a footnote, indent the first line of each footnote the same amount as the

first line of the paragraphs within the paper (1/2”). The indentation should be before the

superscripted footnote number. Insert one space after the superscript number before the first

word of the footnote.36 The footnotes should be single-spaced, and there should be a single blank

space between (or 12-pt. line space after) each footnote.37 Font within the footer should be 10

point (the OWC recommends Times New Roman, 10-pt.).

There is one notable exclusion to notes formatting that most Liberty University students

will encounter. The version or translation of the Bible being used must be identified in the text

with a parenthetical reference (e.g., 1 Cor 1:13, ESV).38 If an author chooses to use the same

Bible translation (such as the English Standard Version) throughout the paper, he or she should

add a footnote in the first usage stating, …

NOTE: Content highlighted in green throughout should NOT be included in any student’s

paper. Such content is included herein as flags to note and bring attention to special rules.

Prepared by Christy Owen, Liberty University’s Online Writing Center, [email protected]

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY

JOHN W. RAWLINGS SCHOOL OF DIVINITY

A Sample Paper for the Purpose of Correct Formatting In

Notes-Bibliography Style for All Students Using Turabian Format

Submitted to Dr. Full M. Name

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the completion of

OBST 515

Old Testament Orientation I

by

Claudia S. Sample

August 5, 2020

ii

Contents

(not Table of Contents)

Only include in graduate/doctoral level papers; shown here for ease of access and visualization

Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 1

Ibid. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 3

Basic Formatting …………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

Overview …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 4

Title Page ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5

Page Numbering…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5

Table of Contents …………………………………………………………………………………………………. 5

Thesis Statements…………………………………………………………………………………………………. 6

Capitalization ………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8

Chapters versus Subheadings …………………………………………………………………………………. 8

Contemporary Art (First-level)…………………………………………………………………………………… 10

What Are the Major Styles? (Second-level) …………………………………………………………… 10

Abstract Expressionism (Third-level) …………………………………………………………. 10

Major painters and practitioners (Fourth-level) …………………………………………… 10

Pollack as the leader (Fifth-level). …………………………………………………. 10

“Voice” and Tense ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 10

Organizing a Paper Using an Outline …………………………………………………………………………. 11

Quotations and Paraphrases ………………………………………………………………………………………. 11

Citations ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 12

iii

Special Applications …………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17

Examples of Citing the Bible ……………………………………………………………………………….. 17

Map, Photography, Figure, or Table ……………………………………………………………………… 19

Crediting Authors of Chapters in Edited Collections ………………………………………………. 19

Numbering ………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 19

Permalinks…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 20

Turabian – Videos ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 20

Turabian – Ebooks with No Page Numbers ……………………………………………………………. 20

Bibliography Entries and Tips ……………………………………………………………………………………. 21

Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 22

Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 27

1

Introduction

“Turabian” style is an abbreviated version of the more-comprehensive “Chicago” style.

Turabian is named for Kate L. Turabian, the author of A Manual for Writers of Research Papers,

Thesis, and Dissertations: Chicago Style for Students & Researchers, which is currently in its

9th printed edition.1 This sample paper will strive to provide students with all the foundational

elements of a Turabian paper using the Notes-Bibliography format for students majoring in

History, (some) Government, and Divinity programs of study. All class assignments will follow

the Notes-Bibliography format except book reviews, which use the Author-Date format (see

the Author-Date section of the OWC’s Turabian Quick Guide for resources on that format).

Many incoming students have opted not to purchase the Turabian manual; this can have

significant negative effects on those students’ ability to learn and master Turabian format.

Fortunately, Liberty University subscribes to the Chicago Manual of Style (CMOS) database in

its Online Library for those students who do not have a current Turabian manual readily

available to them. Since the Turabian manual is the official resource commonly used in

academia, the Online Writing Center (OWC) strongly encourages students to buy the current

Turabian manual (about $10 for hard copy or electronic version). This sample paper, however,

includes references to the correlating CMOS section(s), delineated by red hyperlinked text to

denote the relevant CMOS section, in an effort to ensure all Liberty University students have the

necessary resources to excel academically. It is not proper to include hyperlinks or colored

lettering in academic class papers; those are merely included here for ease-of-access purposes.

1 Kate L. Turabian, A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 9th ed. (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 2018).

2

This paper will focus primarily on the stylistic elements discussed in Chapters 16 and 17

of the Turabian manual2 —with some minor revisions.3 Students will need to incorporate proper

grammatical elements to their papers as well, but those will not be addressed in detail herein.

It is important to delineate that undergraduate students will not use headings,

subheadings, or a contents page in most of their class papers. Graduate and doctoral students

are recommended to include these elements for any paper with at least ten pages in the body,

and required to do so in all papers with twenty or more pages in the body. Those elements are

all included and illustrated throughout this sample paper for organization and ease-of-access

purposes, but students should adhere to the parameters in their specific class assignment to

determine whether or not they should include subheadings (and a contents page, when

appropriate) in that class paper and use the appropriate template provided on the OWC’s

Turabian Quick Guide page.

Many students’ papers will require an introductory section that summarizes or previews

the argument of the whole paper, though this is not universally required for all papers.4 It should

be set apart as a separate First-Level Subheading (addressed below). Leave one double-spaced

line beneath the word Introduction and the text that follows, as shown above.5 Turabian suggests

that “most introductions run about 10 percent of the whole.”6 She also suggests that conclusions

are typically shorter than introductions.

2 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 149-235.

3 For example, footnote numbers in standard Turabian are not superscripted and are followed by a period

(pages 149-50, 162, and 406 of the Turabian manual), but Liberty University programs require superscripted

numbers with no periods, as depicted throughout this paper.

4 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 400, 402.

5 Ibid., 402.

6 Ibid., 107.

3

Ibid.

The abbreviation ibid. is used in most cases to refer to “the same” source cited

immediately before on the same page7—in this case, footnotes #5 and #6 on the prior page. One

of the changes in the 9th edition of the Turabian manual was to discourage the use of the term

ibid. However, all schools and departments within Liberty University have universally decided to

continue to require and encourage its use at this time, as it is a long-used historical term that will

occur in many scholarly resources printed prior to 2018, including most seminal works. As such,

students are instructed to disregard Turabian’s 2018 position on the use of ibid. for all Liberty

University coursework.

The term ibid. itself is a Latin abbreviation (which is why it is italicized in the text of a

sentence), so do include the period. Capitalize it when it begins the footnote, since it depicts the

beginning of a sentence, but do not italicize the term in notes.8 If the page numbers for that

footnote and the one preceding it differ, use Ibid. followed by a comma and the correct page

number(s), as shown in footnotes #5 and #6 on the previous page. If the page number is the same

for both the current footnote and the one that precedes it, simply use the word Ibid. for that

second footnote, as shown in footnote #8 below.

Liberty University’s History Department allows students to carry forward the use of

ibid. onto subsequent pages as long as there are no other sources cited between them. For

all other students, however, each new page of a student’s paper restarts the requirements, so the

first footnoted citation to a source on each page would include the author’s name and a shortened

title (if previously cited), then students can resume using ibid. for subsequent consecutive

7 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 166-67.

8 Ibid.

4

citations on that page, as shown in footnotes #8 above and #12 below. Standard Turabian format

allows two forms of shortened notes,9 but Liberty University programs of study require the

author-title version that includes both the author’s name and a shortened version of the source’s

title. Footnote #11 below (and the first footnote on each new page referring to the Turabian

manual) depicts a shortened note—where the author’s name is given, along with a few words of

the title. Always include the page number, whether using a full footnote or a shortened note.

Basic Formatting

Overview

Turabian generally offers writers great flexibility in the choices they make regarding

many stylistic elements.10 However, Liberty University’s schools and departments have adopted

specific requirements as detailed herein. General formatting elements11 required include:

 One-inch margins on all four sides of the paper.

 Liberty University requires Times New Roman size 12-pt. font for all content in the

paper itself, except Times New Roman 10-pt. font for all footnote content.

 Double-spacing throughout the body of the paper, except in the footnotes, block quotes,

table titles, and figure captions. Lists in appendices should be single-spaced, too.12

 Quotations should be blocked if the citation is five or more lines.

9 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 164-66.

10 For example, Turabian does not specify a font size or style, although all programs of study at Liberty

University using Turabian require Times New Romans, 12-point font. Many other elements are also left by Turabian

up to individual writers; the OWC has incorporated its own educated judgment for those in this sample paper, but

students have freedom to stray from those, where permitted in the Turabian manual.

11 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 384-87.

12 Ibid., 385.

5

Title Page

The Turabian manual provides two different examples and details for the title page

format options.13 Liberty University has adopted the more formal one, as shown in this sample

paper and in the templates provided to students.

Page Numbering

The title page should not include any page number,14 although it is considered the first

page of any paper. The front matter (anything between the title page and the first page of the

body of the paper) should be numbered with lowercase Roman numerals centered in the footer,

beginning with ii, to correspond with the fact that it begins on page two.15 The paper’s body,

bibliography, and appendices display Arabic numerals (i.e., 1, 2, 3) placed flush-right in the

header, beginning with page 1 on the first page of the body of the paper.16 Liberty University

now offers students templates that are already formatted with pagination, margin, font, etc.

Table of Contents

Although this page/section is commonly referred to as the “table of contents,” only the

word “Contents” should appear at the top, centered, without the quotation marks.17 Students may

not need a table of contents, but one was included in this sample paper as a visual aid, and

because it is lengthy enough to include subheadings. Liberty University assignments will specify

if students are required to include subheadings and/or a contents page. Generally, subheadings

13 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 391-92.

14 Ibid., 385.

15 Ibid., 386.

16 Ibid., 386.

17 Ibid., 390, 394-395.

6

and a contents page are required for assignments with twenty pages or more of content, and both

are encouraged for assignments of ten to nineteen pages of content.

The table of contents can span more than one page when necessary, as it does in this

sample paper. Double-space between each item but single-space the individual items themselves.

Add an extra line between each of the major sections (including the front and back matter). It is

important to note that a table of contents does not list the pages that precede it; only those pages

that follow it. Be sure that the first letter of each word is capitalized (other than articles and

prepositions within the phrase).

“Leaders” —the dots between the words on the left margin and their corresponding page

numbers at the right margin in a table of contents—are acceptable. Only include the first page

each element begins on; not the full page-span.18 MS Word will automatically populate this.

Number all pages of this element with Roman numerals. If the table of contents is more

than one page, do not repeat the title. Leave two blank lines between the title and the first listed

item.19 Single-space individual items listed but add a blank line after each item. Between the lists

for the front and back matter and the chapters, or between parts or volumes (if any), leave two

blank lines. This video tutorial shows how to format subheadings and convert those into a

Contents page for larger projects.

Thesis Statements

Section A.2.1.4 of the Turabian manual discusses the placement and labeling of an

abstract or thesis statement. Specifically, it acknowledges that “most departments or universities

18 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 390.

19 Ibid.

7

have specific models … that you should follow exactly for content, word count, format,

placement, and pagination.”20 This paper does not include a separate sample thesis statement

page; some classes will require such. Do not confuse a purpose statement with a thesis statement,

however. A purpose statement states the reason why the paper is written. For all practical

purposes, the purpose statement introduces the thesis statement. An example of a purpose

statement is, “The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that when one recognizes God’s

freedom, he/she can find biblical inerrancy defensible.” An example of a thesis statement is,

“Biblical inerrancy is defensible in the context of divine freedom.” Remember, the purpose and

thesis statements determine the form and content of an outline.

The distinction between a purpose statement and a thesis statement is important. The

purpose of this sample paper is to provide a template for the correct formatting of a research

paper. The thesis is, “Students who use this paper as a sample or template are more likely to

format their papers correctly in the future.”

Line Spacing

Section A.1.3 of the Turabian manual addresses line spacing.21 As mentioned above, all

text in papers should be double-spaced except for block quotes, table titles, figure captions, and

lists in appendices. The table of contents, footnotes, and bibliography entries should be single-

spaced internally, but double-spaced between each entry.22 Turabian specifies in Section A.2.2.4

to “put more space before a subheading than after.”23 Liberty University recommends adding an

20 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 389.

21 Ibid., 385.

22 Ibid., 385.

23 Ibid., 404.

8

extra single-spaced line before each subheading, so the total space between the end of one

section and the next subheading should be the equivalent of three single-spaced lines (or one-

and-a-half double-spaced lines); this is demonstrated throughout this sample paper and pre-

programmed into the Turabian templates. For those students who wish to learn how to format

this element themselves, see the tutorial on formatting subheadings. There should only be one

space after periods and other punctuation at the end of each sentence, before beginning a new

sentence.24

Capitalization

Turabian style has two forms of capitalization for titles: headline-style and sentence-style.

In headline style, all major words in a title (usually those with four or more letters, excepting

prepositions) begin with capital letters.25 In sentence-style, only the first word of a title, the first

word of a subtitle, and proper nouns begin with capital letters.26 Liberty University courses use

headline style for subheadings.

Chapters versus Subheadings

Turabian allows each writer to determine whether to use subheadings or chapters to

divide his or her paper into sections.27 There are separate rules for both. Chapters are usually

reserved for thesis projects and dissertations; subheadings are often used for class papers of

24 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 385.

25 Ibid., 325-26.

26 Ibid., 326.

27 Ibid., 402, 404.

9

graduate and doctoral students. Class assignments will specify whether subheadings are

permitted or required.

Turabian allows great flexibility and individuality in how one formats the various

subheading levels, when used. Liberty University has adopted the format for heading levels

shown herein, for the sake of consistency and uniformity.

The title of a heading should never be “orphaned” at the bottom of a page, without its

supporting text.28 If there is not enough room on the previous page for both the heading title and

at least the first line of the paragraph, begin a new page. Authors can, however, have two

headings in a row29 as shown on page 17 below. The formats used and recommended in this

sample paper reflect that:

1. First-level headings should be centered, bolded, and use headline-style capitalization.

2. Second-level subheadings should be centered, not bolded, and use headline-style

capitalization.

3. Third-level subheadings should be left-justified, bolded, and use headline-style

capitalization.

4. Fourth-level subheadings—though rare in Turabian style—should be left-justified, not

bolded, with only the first letter of the first word capitalized.

5. Fifth-level subheadings are extremely rare; they should be indented ½” from the left

margin, not bolded, italicized, in sentence case (including a period), followed by one

space, with the text following on the same line.

28 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 405.

29 Ibid., 404.

10

Except for fifth-levels, all text would begin on the line beneath the heading. Note that

there must be at least two of any subheading used under a larger heading.30 Turabian also does

not allow orphaned headings, where the heading appears at the bottom of the page, isolated from

its content on the next page.31 First- and second-level subheading levels are used throughout this

sample paper, but below is a visualization of each of five levels.

Contemporary Art (First-level)

What Are the Major Styles? (Second-level)

Abstract Expressionism (Third-level)

Major painters and practitioners (Fourth-level)

Pollack as the leader (Fifth-level). This one is unique in that the text begins on the same

line.

“Voice” and Tense

As a general rule, use active voice and avoid first person (I, me, we, us, our) or second

person (you, your) pronouns in academic writing unless permitted by the assignment

instructions. This paper uses third person (one, this author). In historical writing, use simple past

tense verbs, but when referring to an author’s written work, use present tense.

30 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 404.

31 Ibid., 405.

11

Organizing a Paper Using an Outline

When writing a paper, students should organize their outline first so that they are able to

plan how they will make their argument and then give their reasoning and evidence to support

their thesis statement. The first paragraph of each section should explain how this will fit into the

author’s reasoning, and then each section will end with a summary of how the evidence has

shown such reasoning to be correct. Also, transitions are very helpful at the end of each major

section so that the reader anticipates how the next section is connected to the logical progression

of the reasoning the author uses to support his or her thesis.

Liberty University undergraduate papers will generally be less than ten or twelve pages

and most will not use subheading levels or a contents page at all (unless specified in the

instructions); most Liberty University graduate and doctoral research papers will be no longer

than twenty pages and generally will not have long and detailed outlines or subheadings beyond

the third level.32 Details that would be appropriate for the fourth or fifth heading level tend to

distract the reader’s attention from the overall thesis within a short essay (typically fewer than 20

pages). Even if a fourth level is unavoidable, a fifth level is discouraged.

Quotations and Paraphrases

All content gleaned from another source will be presented as either a quote or a

paraphrase. A paraphrase means that the original wording has been change sufficiently into the

student’s own words while keeping the same meaning (not simply just rearranging the order of

the words or replacing only a few of them); a direct quote means that the words are used

verbatim, which requires quotation marks. Both require a citation with a page number to the

32 Papers with ten to nineteen pages in the body are recommended to include subheadings and a contents

page; those with twenty pages or more are required to do so; the instructions will specify what is required.

12

original source. Quotes with four or fewer lines of text in the student’s paper will be incorporated

into the text of the paragraph, as has been demonstrated herein (such as the bottom of the first

paragraph on page ten).

Quotes that span five lines or more, however, must be block quoted. Blocked quotations

are single-spaced with one blank line before and after each excerpt, and the entire left margin of

the block quote is indented one half-inch. No quotation marks are used when using a blocked

quotation, but do use them if it contains an internal quote. Turabian requires blocked quotes to be

introduced in the writer’s own words.33 For example, Jackson evokes the supremacy of home:

Housing is an outward expression of the inner human nature; no society can be fully

understood apart from the residences of its members. A nineteenth-century melody

declares, “There’s no place like home,” and even though she had Emerald City at her

feet, Dorothy could think of no place she would rather be than at home in Kansas. Our

home are our havens from the world.34

Citations

All content that is taken from another source must include a citation, whether direct-

quoted or paraphrased. Though Turabian allows two forms of citing sources in the body of a

paper, this sample paper focuses exclusively on the notes-bibliography style. Chapters 16 and 17

of the Turabian manual focus on these elements (Chapter 14 in the CMOS). The “N” denotes

(foot)notes, and the “B” denotes bibliography entries. Be sure to use the correct format for each

since there are some variances between them for each resource. Notably, the first/only author’s

name is inverted (i.e., last name first) in bibliography entries, but not in notes.35

33 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 361.

34 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford

Press, 1985), 3.

35 Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 154.

13

When formatting a footnote, indent the first line of each footnote the same amount as the

first line of the paragraphs within the paper (1/2”). The indentation should be before the

superscripted footnote number. Insert one space after the superscript number before the first

word of the footnote.36 The footnotes should be single-spaced, and there should be a single blank

space between (or 12-pt. line space after) each footnote.37 Font within the footer should be 10

point (the OWC recommends Times New Roman, 10-pt.).

There is one notable exclusion to notes formatting that most Liberty University students

will encounter. The version or translation of the Bible being used must be identified in the text

with a parenthetical reference (e.g., 1 Cor 1:13, ESV).38 If an author chooses to use the same

Bible translation (such as the English Standard Version) throughout the paper, he or she should

add a footnote in the first usage stating, …

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